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The History of Oil and Gas Conservation  Legislation  in Arkansas 
I.  Introduction 
2014 is the 75th anniversary of the enactment of the Arkansas  Conservation 
Act,  Act  I 05 of  1939, that imposed  a scheme of state regulation  on oil and gas 
prod uction to avoid waste and protect correlative rights.  The Act created the 
Arkansas  Oi l and Gas Commission  to administer and enforce the regulatory 
scheme.  The purpose of this art icle is to  provide a narrati ve of the history of the 
enactment of  Act  105 of  1939.  The background  of the Act, the Rule of Captu re 
and the prodigious  economic and physical  waste that it yielded  will be examined, 
along with early conservation  attempts in the prod ucing states to stem the vast tide 
of waste.  The early Arkansas  experience with waste and the ineffectual  legislation 
attempts to solve the matter will be explored, including the pivotal  events in the 
Rodessa and Shuler fields that were the catalysis for the enactment of Act  I 05. 
An analysis of the major substantive provisions of Act  105 will be unde1iaken, 
including the shortcomings of the i nitial Act and the subsequent  legislative 
amendments that forged  the Act into an effective comprehensi ve scheme of state 
regulation   that  conserves valuable oil and gas resources. 
II.  The Common Law Background  of Unregulated  Production 
a.  The Rule of Capture 
Oi l and gas in its natural  state, unlike hard  minerals,  is a fluid or vapor.  It is 
fugacious and wi ll migrate across bou ndary lines withi n the subsurface reservoi r. 
It is susceptibl e to drainage from off-tract wells.  The migratory character of oil 
and gas has proved to be its defining physical  characteristic.   It led to the 
venerable rule of capture 1  which permitted  landowners the unrestricted  right to 
drill and produce from wells located on-tract without  incurring liability for off- 
tract drainage.  An early oil and gas practitioner  and commentator  on the oil and 
gas conservation movement  summed up the rule as "the owner of a tract of land 
acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, 
though  it may proved that part of such oil or gas migrated  from adjoining lands."2 
The remedy for the hapless landowner being drained by his adjoining neighbor's 
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well was "Go and do thou  likewise"3,  i .e., dri ll an offset protection  well, the "evil 
twin" of the ru le of captu re. 
The adoption of the rule of capture for oil and gas was premised  on the lack 
of scientific knowledge  of the behavior  of produci ng  reservoi rs that existed 
during the embryonic days of the industry. 4    It was known  that oil and gas wou ld 
migrate across surface bou ndary lines when produced  but the technology did not 
exist to ascertain the source of the prod uction within the  reservoir.  Consequentl y, 
early courts analogized  to the common law of percol ating waters (groundwater) 
and the law of obtaini ng possession  to wild  animals, both of which  applied the 
rule of capture. Regardless  of whether the analogi es to percolati ng waters or wild 
animals were appropriate or not, applying the rule of capture to oi l and gas 
production  occasioned  much waste of oil and gas development  costs and  reserves. 
The early  proponents  of  oi l and gas conservation legislation  bel ieved the judicial 
adoption  of the rule of capture to be an exercise in ignorance. 5    Professor Maurice 
Merri ll, an early oil and gas scholar, wri ting in the early  l 960's, observed that a 
state court adopting the rule of capture did about as well  as could be expected due 
to the then state of the knowledge as to reservoir mechanics. 6    Despi te the evils 
associated  with the rule of capture, it was  not without  its virtue.  The modern 
justification  for the rule is that it rewards those who exercise diligence and take 
the risk in drilling oil and gas wells.7    The rule encourages development  of oil and 
gas reserves. 
b.  Waste 
The  rule of capture as the cornerstone of unregulated  production 
occasioned  much mischief. Because oil and gas is prod uced  from subsurface 
reservoi rs which may, and frequently  do, underlay numerous separately owned 
tracts, the rule of capture simply mandated  the classic "common pool 
exploitation"8  of the reservoir in which each tract owner, to ensure its maximum 
recovery  from the reservoi r, was encouraged to drill as many  wells and produce as 
much oi l and gas from the "common pool," as fast as possi ble.  The consequences 
of the rule of capture was enormous physical  waste including both  surface and 
undergrou nd, as well as economic waste.9 
Surface waste invol ves loss of oil at the surface resul ting from spillage, 
evaporation  and  overflows from ea1ihen surface storage pi ts or open oil tanks and 
leaks from production  and transportation  equipment.   Land was also wasted  as 
numerous wells meant excessive surface usage for drilling, producing operations 
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and  transportation  of the production.  Economic waste was also rampant in that 
unnecessary  investment  was expended in the dri lling and operation of needless 
wells.  For example, in  1965 the East Texas field had  an estimated  17,200 wells 
and one expert  opined that it could have been  efficiently and effectively drained 
by  1500 wells. 1 0 
The rule of capture  also led to undergrou nd waste.  Undergrou nd waste 
occurs when oil and gas in the reservoi r that could have been produced  will be left 
behi nd because  of wasteful  and inefficient  operation of the well or wells. 
Production that impairs the reservoirs natural energy mechanism  that facilitates 
efficient recovery is one source of underground  waste. Oi l and gas reservoi rs are 
distinctly unique as to the reservoi r pressure mechanism that effectuates 
production. 1 1    Gas-cap drives, dissolved-gas drives, water-drives  and any 
combinations of the three may characterize   oi l and gas reservoirs.  In a gas-cap 
drive reservoir, the gas, which  is lighter than oil, is on  top of the oil zone.  As the 
oi l is prod uced, the gas expands to displace the oi l and increases the reservoir 
pressure to drive the oil to the well bore and assists in the l i ft to the surface.  In a 
dissolved-gas reservoi r the gas is dissolved in the oil and as the oil is produced  the 
dissolved  gas in the oil expands to increase the reservoi r pressure and likewise 
facilitate production.   In a water -drive reservoi r, which  are known  for thei r 
potential  for high rates of ul timate recovery from the reservoir, the oil is top of the 
water and as the oi l is produced, the water expands and enhances the reservoi r 
pressure and facil itates production. 
Oil wells that produce high ratios of gas to oil in gas drive reservoi rs or high 
ratios of water to oil in water drive reservoi rs may unduly dissipate the reservoi r 
pressure and thei r production  should be limited if not restrai ned.  A uniform rate 
of production  is necessary to avoid wasted reservoir  energy, and irregular and non- 
uniform migration  of flu ids that may by-pass  large deposi ts of oi l or gas that wi ll 
be left behind  in the reservoir and may result  in premature  abandonment  of the 
field.  The oil-water contact line or the gas-oil contact line needs to move 
uniforml y through  out the reservoi r as the oi l is prod uced  to avoid  "channeling" 
or "coning" that traps or by-passes  oil or gas in the reservoi r that may never be 
recovered. 
Underground  waste, like surface and economic waste, was rampant under 
unregulated  prod uction and the rule of capture. 1 2   Excessive number of wells 
draining the reservoi r without  regard  to either the oi l/gas ratios or oil/water ratios, 
characterized  production  in the early years of the 20th century.  Wide open flow of 
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wells, the practice of the early operators  whose vocabu l ary did not contain the 
word  "choke", exacerbated  the problem.   Likewise, the practice of venting or 
flaring the gas was monstrousl y wasteful  of oil and gas reserves.   In the early days 
of the industry, there was no market  for gas and it was viewed  as a worthless by- 
product  of oil production.   More over, a general  belief existed  that  i f a well 
initiall y prod uced  only gas, the well had  to be "blown out", to deplete the gas in 
the reservoir  before the well would  produce oil. 1 3   Tremendous physical  waste, 
much of it undergrou nd, was experienced. 
The perils of underground  waste were  not early known.  Unlike surface 
spills or evaporation  of oil from surface pits, underground  waste couldn 't be 
observed.  Bottom  hole pressure tests that could  lead to the obvious conclusion 
that declining prod uction was related  to declining pressure  only became prevalent 
in the late  l 920's.  Petroleum  engineeri ng, the science of  reservoi r performance, 
was  in a nascent  state of development.   However,  an awareness of reservoir 
characteristics and behavior  and prudent  management  to avoid physical  and 
economic waste was developi ng. 
c.  The Doctrine of Correlative  Rights 
The common  law doctrine of correlative rights 14  developed parallel  with  the 
evolution  of the science of underground  waste.  The doctrine is premised  on the 
recognition  that mineral  owners to tracts that overly the reservoi r share "reciprocal 
rights and duties in the common source of supply." 1 5   Each landowner has the right 
to produce his fair share of the common  source of supply and the duty not to 
negligently  or intentionall y injure the common  source of supply.  Negligent 16  or 
intentional 1 7 spoilation of the common  source of supply incurs liabili ty.  Likewise, 
the defendant 's surreptitious production  in excess of his well allowable established 
by the conservation  agency's Proration Order  that resulted in drainage from the plaintiff 
s adjacent production  unit incurred liability for breach of the correlative rights doctrine. 1 
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Described as an exception to the non-lia bility for drainage feature of the rule of 
capture, 19  the correlative rights doctrine is based on the necessity of maintaining  and 
utilizing  reservoir pressure to obtain maximum ultimate recovery from the common 
source of supply.  The  doctrine is a recogni tion that the landowner's  property  interest is 
not merely  in the oil and gas in that portion of the common source of supply  that 
underlies his tract but extends to the right to "make use of the expulsive forces which 
constitute the reservoir energy."20  The reservoir  energy, like the oil and gas, constitute a 
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common source of suppl y.21    Stated another way, the oil and gas and the reservoir energy 
are a "package" that comprise the landowner's property  interest in the oil and gas estate. 
The emergence and acceptance of the doctrine of correlative rights pmiended  that 
comprehensive  oil and gas conservation  acts, when adopted, would   serve dual purposes: 
the prevention  of waste and the protection  of correlative rights.  These two objectives,  it 
has been observed, are "coequals, each worthy  of pursuit  in its own right, one for the sake 
of what may be called economy , the other for the sake of equity."22    Others, however, 
have opined that in the event of a conflict between  the prevention  of waste and protection 
of prope1ty rights under the correlative rights doctrine  under conservation  acts, the 
former prevails. 23 
III. The Early Conservation Acts 
The depressed price for crude oil was the paramount  problem  of the industry 
during the era of unregulated  production  and the rule of capture.  The race to drill as 
many wells and produce as much oil as possible yielded production  in excess of the 
demand for oil and the transpmiation  facilities in the field.  Precipitous  declines in the 
price of crude were experienced.   The goal of the industry  was state control of production 
so that the problem  of  surplus capacity could be eliminated.   The rule of capture was the 
target for reform under the guise of conservation, including the prevention  of economic 
and physical  waste, but the primary objective was market stabilization.2 4    Though it was 
inevitable that the attempt to limit the supply of crude, and raise its price, as an objective 
of conservation, would prove controversial, the effect of the relationship  of  "distressed 
crude oil" to physical waste was real: 
"The inevitable result of the rule of capture's complete lack of legal restraint  
has been to force producers  into one drilling race after another, in which 
each sought to drill as many wells as possible, as quickly as possible, in 
order to capture for himself the lion's share of the spoils.  Nearly every 
discovery of an impo1iant oil field brought a mad rush of drilling that often 
produced  more oil than the market could absorb.  Whenever  this occurred, 
the unhappy  operator who could not find a buyer for his oil neve1iheless 
continued to produce his wells rather than have his more fo1iunate 
neighbors  drain oil from his lands.  In field after field, wi th no other 
facilities available, this surplus oil was "stored" in pits dug out of raw earth, 
and even in open ditches; appalling quantities of oil were lost through 
evaporation and seepage, surface and underground  waters were polluted, and 
serious fire hazards  created, sometimes with disastrous results."25 
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a.  Prorationing 
Prorationing  is the obvious remedy for dea ling with the problem  of  "distressed 
oil."  In market  demand prorationing,  the state conservation agency restricts statewide 
production  to the estimated market  demand  and then allocates the state total back  to either 
fields or reservoi rs and then to individual  wells. 26    Thus, each prod ucing well  is assigned 
an "allowable."  The intended  effect is to accumulatively  reduce the state's production  to 
equa l the market  demand.  The first proration  statute was a market  demand statute and 
was enacted in Oklahoma  in  1915 after discovery of the huge Healdton  and Cushing 
fields whose production  glutted  an already saturated market with  oil far in excess of 
market demand.27    The Act   defined   waste to include  "production in excess of marketing 
or transpo1iation facilities or reasonable  market  demand"28  and authorized the 
Corporation  Commission  to prorate production  from any common source of supply to 
avoid such waste.29    Texas passed  a similar market  demand proration  statute in  1919.30 
Prorationing  can also operate to limit the production  from wells  in the reservoir to 
a rate of production  that avoids physical waste without  out regard  to the market  for the 
production.   Rapid and indiscriminate  rates of production  may dissipate reservoir pressure 
and cause underground  waste of oil reserves.   Parallel with  the development  of the theory 
of underground  waste was the theory of the Maximum  Efficient  Rate of production 
(MER) that maintains  reservoir  pressure and yields ultimate maximum  recovery  of oil. 
The MER has been defined as the as the "highest sustainable rate at which a field can be 
produced  for a designated  period  without appreciable loss in ultimate oil recovery."31 
MER likely does not entail one rate of production that will yield maximum  ultimate 
recovery  but a range of production  rates that attain efficient operation and maximum 
recovery  over the life of the well.32 
Market demand proration  and MER prorationing  could have been jointly 
administered  in a state's prorationing  scheme.  Under such a scheme, an allowable under 
market  demand prorationing  for a well could not be greater than the allowable for that 
well  under MER prorationi ng.  An allowable in excess of the MER  allowable would 
permit an inefficient rate of production  that may cause underground   waste.  If the market 
demand allowable is below  the MER allowable, than the market  demand allowable is 
operative.   However, joint  administration  of MER and market  demand prorationing  may 
not have been the general practice. 33 
Despite its controversy, market  demand prorationing  continued until the early 
l 970's when the market  changed and the demand  for oil eclipsed the market  supply of oil. 
Today, market  demand prorationing  is only of historical  interest.   However, some states 
still maintain  the statutory  framework that would permit  implementation  of market 
demand prorationing  when supply exceeds demand. 
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b.  Ratable  Taking 
Market  demand or MER prorationing  may result  in physical  waste unless   oil is 
purchased  ratably  from each well prod ucing  in the common source of supply.   Ratable 
taking requires each purchaser to spread out the amount of its purchase  from the reservoir 
equally between  each producing  wel l.  Otherwise,  some wells in the reservoir  may 
produce more, while other wells produce  less, or none, resulting  in an imbalance in 
production within  the reservoir  that may create an non-uni form oil-water  or gas-oil 
contact line and trap or by-pass  oil that may be left behi nd.  Additionally,  in the absence 
of ratable taking, the producing  tracts may drain the non-producing  tracts  in violation  of 
the doctrine of correlative rights.  The statutory remedy was typically a ratable take 
statute, sometimes referred  to as a common purchaser  statute, that required  a purchaser  to 
take ratabl y from all wells in the field.  Oklahoma  enacted the first ratable take statute, 
applying  only to gas, in  1913 .34 
c.  Well  Spacing Acts 
Well spacing acts were also central to the control of production  and the abatement 
of the enormous   economic  and physical  waste that  followed the rule of capture.   Such 
acts limit the number and location of wells that can be drilled  in a reservoir  to eliminate 
unnecessary  wells and their cumulative excessive rates  of production.   Relying  on its 
general statutory authority to make rules and regulations  to prevent waste of  oil and gas, 
the Texas Railroad  Commission (TRC) promulgated  Rule 37, the Texas well  spacing 
regulation, was promulgated   in  1919.35    Rule 37 simply prohi bited  the drilling of a well 
nearer than 300' to any other wells or nearer than  150' to any prope1ty  line.  This basically 
established a spacing pattern that prohibited  drilling on a tract of less than two (2) acres. 
However, exception wells were expressly   permitted  to prevent  waste and protect 
correlative rights. Rule 37 was much amended  as the spacing patterns  were enlarged. 
d.  Forced Integration  (Compulsory Pooling) 
Pooling  is complementary  to the establishment  and operation of  spacing or drilling 
units under well-spaci ng Acts.  Because the area encompassed  by the drilling unit is 
limited to one ( I ) well  for the common source of supply, some legal mechanism  is needed  
to merge or pool  the separately owned tracts situated within the unit so that they 
constitute  one ( I ) tract for well-spacing  purposes.  Voluntary  pooling achieves that resul t. 
Oil and gas leases typically  contain pooling  clauses36  that expressly permit the lessee to 
pool the tract with other tracts  for purposes  of satisfying the well-spacing  requirements. 
Thus, the  lessees   and any unieased mineral  owners of the separately owned tracts 
situated in the dri lling unit may agree on a plan of development  for the drilling and 
operation of the unit well and voluntarily  pool their interests.  Voluntary pooling has the 
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legal effect of integrating  the separately owned  tracts within the drilling unit so that they 
are treated  as one tract  for purposes  of oil and gas development.   Consequently, 
production  from a well anywhere on the unit satisfies the habendum  clause's secondary 
term requirement  of production,  regardless  of the location of the unit wel l.37  Likewise, 
voluntary pooling appo1iions royalty on a surface-acreage  basis. 38 
Forced  integration  is necessary   to permit  development  of a drilling unit when  the 
working interest owners and unleased  mineral  owners fail to agree to the plan of 
development  and voluntary  pooling.   Courts refused  to judicially  effectuate pooling, known 
as "equitable pooling,"  to permit the developing paiiy  in the drilling unit to drill a unit well  
when non-consenting  working  interest owners refused  to voluntarily pool. 19 Thus, 
development  of the drilling unit could  be thwarted  by non-consenting  unit interests in the 
absence of state compulsion provided  by  forced  integration.   Forced  integration statutes 
typically  have the legal effect of integrating  the separately owned tracts withi n the drilling 
unit so that they are treated  as one tract  for purposes  of oil and gas development. Likewise, 
conservation  acts typically  mandates  that prod uction from a well  anywhere  on the unit 
satisfies the habendum  clause's secondary term  requirement  of production40  and also  
appo1iion royalty on a surface-acreage basis.41 
e.  Unitization 
Unitization  of oil and gas reservoirs  involves integrating  or unitizing  the common 
source of supply to permit  its development and operation as a single unit.42    Unitization 
involves the process  of conve1iing the leasehold  and mineral  interest in each individual 
tract or production  unit into an interest in the unitized  area that permits  operations without 
regard  to the surface prope1iy  lines.  The geologic characteristics  of the reservoir  and 
principles of reservoir  engineering determine the optimum  number  and location of wells, 
the MER rate of production,  and avoidance of wells yieldi ng higher than optimal  ratios of 
gas or water to oil. 
In the early  I 920's, Henry L. Doherty,4 3  the CEO of Cities Service Oil Co., 
championed  a federal statute to compel unitization  for the development  and operation  of 
all oi l and gas reservoirs.   In the midst of prodigious  waste  of oil and gas reserves, 
Doheiiy believed  that the crude oil producers  would  never abandon unregulated 
production  or that the producing  states would adopt effective conservation  laws.   Under 
D0he1iy's plan, federal  fieldwide unitization  would  obviate the need  for well-spacing, 
prorationing  and ratable take statutes.  The industry's attitude was that "there was  no evil 
then known  which was so great as to justify  federal control or regulation"44  of oil and gas 
production.   Though  D0he1iy was  a prominent  voice for reform, he proved to be no 
prophet  for federal unitization. 
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Unitization  can be accomplished  by volunta ry unitization  or compulsory 
unitization  pursuant to state conservation  acts.  Voluntary unitization  involves the 
agreement of the working  interests and mineral  interests in all or a part of the reservoir to 
undertake joint  operations  to develop the unit or engage in an enhanced recovery 
operation.45    Unitization  involves a plan of development  or enhanced  recovery that will 
entail an analysis of the engineering  and economics for the proposed  project.   If the plan 
of operation is proposed,  a tract participation  formula  is developed that will  allocate the 
production  as well as the costs for the unit.  Unlike pooling which allocates production 
and cost for the pooled  uni t on a surface acreage basis, unitization  allocates production 
and costs for the separately owned tracts or production  units on their potential  for oil 
productivity  from the unit.  Thus, the unit participation  formula  for each tract may be 
based on a combination  of factors, such as tract acreage, net acre feet of pay and volume 
of oil in place, differences in porosity in the field, current and cumulative production  and 
projection  of recovery  from each well.46    Forming a unitization  project is a lengthy and 
involved process. 
Unitization  in the early days was a hard sell.47    Some working  interest or mineral 
owners won 't like the paiiicipation  formula.   Some believe they would  fare better on their 
own independent  leasehold  operation.   Fears of excessive costs of unit operations  may 
exist.  During the  l 940's, oil and gas producers  lacked experience in evaluating a unit 
interest in exchange for an interest in a wholly owned Iease.48    Compulsory unitization  is 
required, or should be required,  as a remedy for the minority non-consenting  interests 
whose refusal  to execute the unitization  agreement impedes voluntary unitization. 
Louisianan  is reputed to have adopted the first compulsory unitization  statute but it was 
limited to gas recycli ng operations.   Oklahoma's original compulsory unitization  statute49 
was enacted  in  I 945. 
(4) The  1930's: Distressed  Oil and the Interstate Oil Compact 
The discovery of the Oklahoma  City field and the East Texas field in the early 
l 930's flooded an already depressed market with distressed crude.50    The price of crude 
oil fell to  IO cents a barrel.  The price of Arkansas  crude fell to  I O cents a barrel  in  1933. 
In  1930-31 , the state national  guard was called out in both Texas and Oklahoma  to close 
the Oklahoma  City and East Texas fields to prevent fu1iher physical  waste of oil and gas. 
The problem  was so severe that oil and gas  producing  states began to consider an 
interstate  compact that would authorize collective state action to deal with the problems 
of waste and excess market  demand.  Avoiding legislation by congress that would impose 
federal regulation  of oil and gas conservation  was the impetus for the formation  of the 
Interstate Oil Compact (]QC). 
The driving force for the creation of the Interstate Oil Compact (IOC) was to 
establish a compulsory system of state market demand proration  to stabilize the price of 
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oil.  Ultimately,  the creation of an IOC as a supra-governmental  entity that could compel 
states to enact and enforce particular  oil and gas conservation schemes failed.  The IOC 
was approved by Congress in  1935 and operates solely in an education and advisory 
capacity that  accumulates information  on oil and gas conservation,  assists member  states 
in enacting sound oil and gas conservation laws and educates the public on the 
importance of the conservation  of oil and gas resources.  The Interstate Oil Compact 
Commission  (IOCC), the governing body of the IOC, was most successful  in 
disseminating the theory of physical  and economic waste resulting from un regulated 
production  and encouraging the prorationing  and well-spacing.  The arrival of the IOCC 
on the scene with its educational mission  for oil and gas conservation  signifies that 
knowledge of the science of oil and gas reservoirs  and prudent reservoir management  to 
avoid underground  waste was well-known. 
Consequently, the  l 930's were the era of the impo1iant oil and gas conservation 
acts.  Oklahoma  adopted a comprehensive  conservation  act in  1933, Louisiana and New 
Mexico adopted  conservation acts  1935.  Admittedly,  comprehensive  state conservation 
acts that dealt adequately with waste of valuable natural resources were late in coming. 
As early as  1925, the industry  had generally known that their time honored  methods  of 
production were inefficient. 5 1    Ignorance of the prodigious  underground  waste that 
occurred from premature  dissipation of the reservoir pressure had long cease to be an 
excuse for inefficient  production  practices.   Unwillingness  to submit to governmental 
regulation  and resistance to change proved  to be difficult obstacles to overcome in the 
battle for  adequate  comprehensive  conservation regulation.  As noted by Robe1i E. 
Hardwicke, one of the early pioneers  of oil and gas conservation observed: 
Undoubtedly,  the great majority  of oi l men of that time were skeptical as to 
the advisability of abandoning  long and established  view points  and 
practices  (drill and produce  according to your own ideas of efficiency and 
economics; drain oil from neighbori ng lands and protect your own land 
against adverse drainage as best you can).52 
Additionally,  the period  ushered  in a system of market demand proration that 
lasted until the early  l 970's when domestic supply changed from supply in excess of 
demand to demand in excess of supply.   At that time, market demand proration  dropped 
out of the system and MER prorationing  reigned  supreme. 
I O 
 
IV.  Waste  and Conservation  Legislation  in Arkansas 
a.  Physical Waste in Arkansas 
The rnle of capture was not benign  in Arkansas.   The history  of oil and gas 
production  in the State is replete with  examples of excessive well density, undue surface 
waste and physical waste of oil and gas.  W. Henry Rector, author of a tract on the history 
of Arkansas'  early Oil and Gas Conservation  laws,53 summed  up the waste of oil and gas 
that occurred  in the El Dorado and  Smackover fields, discovered  in  1921 and  1922, 
respectively: 
"The manner  in which the El Dorado and Smackover fields were operated  is 
a disgrace to the industry.  Millions  of barrels  of oil were allowed to escape, 
polluting the waters  of Smackover Creek and thereafter the Ouachita  River. 
The conservation  of gas produced  with the oil was unheard  of, billions  of 
cubic feet being  allowed to go to waste.  The excuse was that the wells were 
oil wells; that the gas was merely  incidental; that oil could not be lifted 
without  liberating the gas, and that as the production  of oil was the supreme 
object of the operators, they could not be concerned  with the gas.  Only a 
small po1iion  of the gas produced  was devoted to utilitarian  purposes.   Oil 
wells and gas wells producing  richly gas would sometimes catch fire and be 
allowed  to burn  for weeks at a time.  Great craters formed  in p01iions of 
Smackover field and raging infernos consumed billions  of feet of gas, 
creating conflagrations  that could be seen for fifty miles."54 
b.  Act  l 66 of l 917 
Arkansas attempts to conserve oil and gas by legislation  began early and dealt with 
distinct problems  of waste.   The first legislative act was Act  166, Session Acts of  1917,55 
that dealt with shallow gas production  in the early gas fields in Sebastian County.  The Act 
required, inter alia, the confinement  of water formations  in the drilling of the wells to 
avoid flooding the productive reservoir, 56  mandated  plugging  of abandoned  oil and gas 
wells,57  prohibi ted the long term venting of gas58,  and limited the production  of gas to not 
in excess of  20%59  of the open hole capacity of the well.  The latter requirement  was 
likely to prevent  loss of "back pressure" to prevent water encroaclunent  on the prod ucing 
formation from underlying  formations of water.60   The Act was to be enforced  by an 
Inspector  of Gas,61  appointed by the Governor, and assessment of fines for violations. 62 
11 
 
c.  Act 664 of 1923 
The discovery of the Smackover oil field in  1922 led to a  1923 statute that 
expanded the prohibition  on waste 63  Al though entitled an "Act  to conserve crude oil or 
petroleum  and natural gas," the emphasis on the prevention of waste was on gas 
production.   The act mandated  that all pipeline companies, gas distributors, oil and gas 
drilling and producing  operators  prevent all waste of oil and gas in their respecti ve 
operations, including leakage and spillage from thei r equipment  and facil ities, as well as 
production  in "any manner or under any such conditions as to constitute waste."64    Such 
waste was specifically defined as the emitting or flaring of natural gas, drowning a 
commercial  gas stratum wi th water, underground  waste, and the wasteful  utilization  of 
gas.65   The Act expressly prohibit gas in the reservoir  from being used to flow the oil to 
the surface when the gas could be "separated" from the oil production. 66    Other than 
surface waste, the only waste of oil forbidden   was underground  waste which was not 
specifically defined.  In lieu of a market demand proration  scheme for gas, the act 
provided  that when the reservoir production  exceeded the market demand, a producer 
could only take his proportionate  share of the natural flow that could be marketed  without 
waste.67    The Act also imposed a "a common purchaser and ratable take" scheme for the 
purchase of gas production. 68 
Conspicuously  absent from the Act was the lack of regulation  on oil production.   The 
act imposed no well-spacing,  unitization, market demand prorationing  or ratable take 
obl igations on oil production.   The Smackover Field was developed  under the rule of 
capture with the physical  and economic waste associated with its legions of unnecessary 
wells.  The Act did vest the Arkansas Railroad  Commission, succeeded by the Board of 
Conservation  (Board) in  1927,69  with the authority to administer the Act and  promulgate 
all necessary rules and regulations  to conserve oil or gas including the  imposition of 
further control over the production  of  oil or gas.70   Arguably, the Arkansas  Railroad 
Commission   had the authority to implement  controls on production  by rule making.  No 
such administrative  regulations  were enacted. 
Smackover Field appears to be comprised of associated  oil and gas reservoirs. 
Gas was a waste product in  1923, without a market, and wanton venting or flaring of the 
gas was the rule of the day.  In addition to the gas bei ng wasted,   dissipation of the 
reservoir pressure by venting and flaring the gas was causing underground  waste of oil. 
The Board had the authority to enforce the Act's prohibitions  against venting or flaring 
gas.  However, enforcing the Act's prohibition  of venting and flaring gas would have 
limited, if not prohibited  oil production, the only play in the field.  Needless  to say, the 
Act was never enforced.  The explanation offered for the lack of enforcement  is that the 
State legislature  levied a severance tax of 2 Yi of market value on oil and gas a month 
before the enactment of the Conservation  measure. 71    Enforcing  the Act to prevent the 
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waste of  gas would have greatly reduced  the flush oil production,  decreasing the oil 
severance revenues that were filling the coffers of the state's treasury,  as well as the 
operators.72 
d.  Act 234 of 1933 
The state legislature primarily  re-enacted  the substantive provisions  of the  1923 
Conservation  Act as  Act 234 of  1933.73    The Arkansas Board of Conservation was 
created to administer the Act. The five (5) member Board were to be "experienced in and 
having a fair knowledge of the oil and gas industry."74   The waste of oil and gas as 
defined and proscribed  in the  1933 Act were identical  to the provisions  of the  1923 Act.75 
The common purchaser  and ratable take and market demand proration provisions  for gas 
were also identical.76   The  Board  of Conservation  was authorized to promulgate  rules and 
regulations. 77    Ominously, however, the Board 's  authority to impose further 
administrati ve control over oil and gas production  by rule making was excluded by the 
1933 Act. 
1.  The Rodessa  Field 
1937 was a lamentable year for Act 234 and the Board  of Conservation.  The 
Rodessa  Field, discovered  in  1935, spanned from Jefferson, Texas to Caddo Parish in 
Louisiana, was extended into south Miller County, Arkansas by a discovery well  in June 
of  1937.  The Rodessa Field was the most impotiant oil and gas discovery in Arkansas 
since  1925.  The discovery well indicated that the reservoir had a large gas cap and to 
attain optimum recovery from the reservoir production  of gas should be minimized. 78 Both 
Louisiana  and Texas regulated  the production  in their respective share of the tri- state 
field by well-spacing  and prorationing  regulations.   The Board of Conservation  was 
largely dormant in Arkansas at the time of the Rodessa  Field discovery because of the 
lack of funding.79    The Board only had two employees, a field man and a stenographer. 80 
There was  no geologist or petroleum  engineer employed by the Board.  The agency was 
not adequately staffed or funded to deal with the challenge of the Rodessa  Field. 
Moreover, Act 234 was inadequate to address the issues of waste and the protection  of 
correlative rights. 81    Nevertheless,  with  10 wells having been completed in the field, the 
Board  issued an Order that dictated a scheme of well spacing and prorationing  for the 
Arkansas  field  consistent with the Texas and Louisiana regulations. 82    A hue and cry 
against the Order was raised by furious landowners, operators and royalty owners and the 
local press.   Mass meeti ngs of protests were held and the governor was implored   to 
intervene and seek the lifting of the Order by the Board. 83    Three days before the Order 
was to be effective, it was enjoined  by a Miller County court in an action brought by a 
local operator.  One argument advanced by the operator before the local cowi was that 
market demand prorationing  had nothing to do with physical  waste and everything to do 
with price fixing.84 
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The state court injunction allowed continuation of the unrestrained  production  that 
lasted  for approximately  one year.  During that period the Rodessa  Field in Arkansas lost 
76% of its reservoir pressure while Louisiana and Texas  lost 34% and  I 8% of their 
respective reservoi r pressure. 85   The loss of pressure was a result  of excessive and non- 
ratable flow rates from the wells and the dense well-spacing. 86    It is estimated in  I 938 that 
the Arkansas portion  of the field prod uced  $7 million in oil but that the underground 
waste caused by the unregulated  prod uction resu lted in $25 million  in non- 
recoverable  reserves being left behi nd.87   Approximatel y  1300 acres of the 
estimated  3500 acre field had  been  developed  by 98 wells at the end of the year of 
unregulated  production. 88   The dissipation  of the reservoir  pressure by the closely 
spaced wells and open flow prod uction made it uneconomical  to developed the 
remai nder of the acreage.89 
2.  The Schuler Field 
The contrast between  the physical  waste in the Arkansas  section of the tri- 
state field resu lting from unregulated  production  and the exemplary performance 
from the regulation  prod uction in Louisiana  and Texas made a compelli ng case for 
regulated  production.   The lesson was not  lost on the interested  paiiies i n the 
Schuler Field that  was discovered  in July of  1937.  Royalty owners, operators and 
landowners  from the Schuler Field area petitioned  the Board  of Conservation  for a 
hearing on the problems  of uncontrolled  prod uction.90    Because the Board was 
without jurisdiction  to enforce well-spaci ng and its authori ty to Order 
prorationi ng questionable  due to the Miller County injunction,  and it was withou t 
funds or petroleum  engineers, the Schuler Field group agreed to provide funds to 
hire the necessary personnel  so that regulations  for the field could be promulgated 
and implemented  by the Board.91  The group volu ntari ly agreed to abide by the 
Board 's rules and regulations.   The arrangement was to last until  the Board of 
Conservation  asked to resume state regulation.   The Board  agreed to the 
arrangement  and the funds were advanced, engineers hired, and the Board  held a 
hearing and issued well-spaci ng and prorationi ng regulations  for the Schuler 
Field.92 The aJTangement  proved  to be successfu l and the Schuler field avoided 
much of the tragedy that plagued  the Arkansas Rodessa  Field. 
The volu ntary scheme of controlled product ion, with the Board  of 
Conservation  as the administrator for the Schuler Field, was a stopgap measure 
designed to avoid  irreparable physical  waste and violation  of correlative rights  in 
the Schuler Field to give the state time to enact an adequate and comprehensive 
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Conservation  Act.  During the i nterval  a committee of legislators, oi l and gas 
operators and members of the Board of Conservation  drafted  a proposed  Act to 
submit to the legislature as a replacement  to Act 234.93   O.C. Bailey, the Chairman 
of the Board of Conservation, and the first Chairman of the AOGC, reported  the 
drafting committee adopted the 'best features'  of the conservation  laws of other 
states.94    Chairman Bai ley attended the initial  meetings of the IOGC and was  likley 
knowledgeable  of the "model acts" the IOGC had been  drafting since the early 
l 930's.  Bailey opined  that the drafting committee's Act, destined  to be enacted as 
Act  I 05 of  1939, was the "most modern and comprehensi ve statute adopted by any 
up to that time."95 
Bail ey's view was not universall y accepted.   It has been recorded  that the 
interim between the implementation   of the voluntary  conservation  scheme in the 
Schuler field and the passage of Act  l 05, was a period  of "vil i fication, 
misunderstandi ng, scurri lous newspaper  editorials, and vitrolic public expression 
of opinion" particularly  on  prorationi ng.96   The adoption  of well-spaci ng, forced 
integration,  and proration  of prod uction that ended unregulated  production  of oil 
and gas under the rule of capture did not happen  without  a struggle. 
V. The Arkansas  Oil and Gas Conservation  Act of 1939 (Act 105 of 1939) 
The  1923 Conservation  Act was doomed as an effective oil and gas 
conservation  Act.  The lack of comprehensive coverage, particularly  the absence 
of an oil pro-rationi ng, a common purchaser  or ratable take, and well-spaci ng to 
limit the density of  drilling, left the industry as it had  come into being, 
unregulated  and vulnerable to waste and instabil ity.  The Arkansas Oil and Gas 
Conservation  Act, Act  I 05 of  1939, was enacted in  1939 to correct the 
deficiencies  of the prior Act and to provide a comprehensive regulatory  scheme to 
prevent  waste and protect  correlati ve rights.97   The Act is representati ve of the 
numerous  state oil and gas conservation  statutes enacted  in the  1930s to remedy 
the evils associated  with common pool  exploitation  by modi fying the rule of 
capture and regulati ng the drilling of production  of oil and gas. 
The Act  expressly provi des that  all common  sources of supply for oil  and 
gas discovered  after January  I , 1937 shall be controlled  and  regulated  by Act 
105.98    Al though  the Act  was enacted  on February  20,  1939, the legislatu re 
specificall y make the statute retroact ive to January  I ,  1937.  The obvious 
reason  for the legislature 's maki ng the Act  effect ive as to common  sources of 
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suppl y discovered  after  1937 is tha t the Board  of Conservat ion had  regu l ated or 
attempted  to regu late the Rodessa  and  Schu l er fields that had  been d iscovered 
before that date.  Su rely, a majo ri ty of the interests  in the Schu ler field, some of 
whom had pa rticipated  in the draft ing of the Act, wanted  the protection  of Act 
I 05.  In early days of the Act, the number of wells in the u ncontrolled  fields 
exceeded  the nu mber of wells  in the control l ed fields.99    U ncontrolled 
prod uctio n  still  exists in Arkansas. 
a.  The Arkansa s Oil  and Gas Commission 
The Act  established  the AOGC  to admi nister the prod u ction and 
conservat ion  sect ions of the Act. 1 00   The AOGC  is authorized  to promulgate 
ru les and  regulations  to ensu re the proper  administrati on and  enforcement  of 
the Act. 1 01    The Act,  as well  as the AOGC 's ru les and regu l at ions, is enforced 
by a fine of no more than  $2,500  for vi olation as well  as each day of 
violat ion. 1 02    Producti on in violation  of the Act  known  as i llegal oi l , gas or 
prod uct  is sanctioned 1 03  and  subsequent  dealing, such as sell ing, pu rchasi ng, or 
refi ning of i l legal oil, gas or prod uct  is prohibited. 104   The administration  and 
enforcement  of the Act,  includi ng all AOGC 's activities,  is funded  exclusively 
by a tax  on oi l  and gas prod uct ion. 1 05 
b.  Prevention  of Waste  and Protection  of Correlative Rights 
The pu rpose of the Act  is to prevent  waste and protect  correlat ive 
rights. 106   The common occurrences of physical waste of oil and gas associated 
with the rule of capture are proscribed  by the Act.  The following are expressly 
prohibited:  ( I ) "inefficient, excessive, or improper use" of reservoi r  energy, and 
the locating, spacing, dri lling, equipping, operating or prod ucing of any oi l or gas 
well  or wells in a manner which results in less than ultimate recovery; 1 07 
(2)"inefficient  storing of oi l and the locating, spacing, dri lling, equipping, 
operating, or producing of any oil or gas well" that  reduces surface loss or 
destruction  of oil or gas usage; 1 08  (3) abuse of correlati ve rights due to 
nonu niform,  disproportionate,  and unrata ble withdrawals causing undue drainage 
between  tracts; 1 09(4)"producing  oil  or gas in such [a] manner  [causing] 
unnecessary water channeling or coning;" 1 1 0  (5) operating wells with inefficient 
oil-gas ratios; 1 1 1  (6) "drowning with  water. ..any stratum capable of prod ucing oi l 
or gas 1 1 2  (7) penni tting  "the escape into the open air of gas in excess of the amount 
that  is necessary  for the efficient drill ing or operation  of a well produci ng both  oil 
and gas;" 1 13and permitti ng gas to escape from a well prod ucing gas. 1 14 Any act or 
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practice that resul ts in undergrou nd   waste is proscri bed  even if not  specifically 
defined by the Act. 1 15 
c.  Proration  and Ratable Take 
Prorationi ng for oi l, as well as gas, or both, was authorized  in Act. 1 16 
Unlike the predecessor  act of  1933 that  limited  the amount of  gas prod uction 
from gas wells when the  supply of gas exceeded  market  demand, MER 
prorationi ng was authorized  by the Act.  The language of the Act simply 
authorizes  the Commission to prorate prod uction  of oil or gas, or both, from any 
field or pool  to prevent  waste. 1 1 7   Omitted  from the statute is the language usabl y 
contained  in market  demand proration  acts that expands the definition of waste to 
include production  "in excess of transportat ion or market  faci lities or reasonable 
market  demand." 1 18   The legislatu re bailed  out on market  demand prorationi ng. 
Assumabl y, the critics of market  demand prorationi ng from the Rodessa  and 
Schuler field battles killed a market  demand proration  scheme in Act  I 05. 
However, well allowables were likely not exclusively assigned  solely on 
the principles  of efficient rate of production  of  MER.  The  production from the 
uncontrolled  fields was the obstacle.  The Act requi red the AOGC  to determine 
the aggregate amount of the statewide  production  from the controlled  reservoirs 
and fields by MER prorationi ng. 1 1 9   The Act did not specify how the aggregate 
amount of prod uction  from the uncontrolled  fields was to be determined but it 
was to be calculated.  Once the statewide total  of oil or gas production  was 
establ ished, that amount was to be allocated  between  the controlled  and 
uncontrolled  reservoi rs on a "reasonable basis." 120   "Small wells" in the 
uncontrolled  reservoi rs were to be given a "sufficient allowable",  i.e., a "living 
allowable," that would  not accelerate or encourage thei r premature 
abandonment. 1 21 
The question  is fairly presented  as to whether the AOGC used  market 
demand prorationing  to determine the aggregate statewide production  from both 
the controlled  and uncontrolled  fields.  As to the controlled prod uction, they 
would  only l imit a well 's allowable if the market  demand  allocation was below  its 
MER allocation.   Although  Arkansas  is not usually l isted as one of the market 
demand proration  states, 122  there is some hint that the AOGC might have engaged 
in the practice.   The suspicions surrounds Order No. 38-39 1 23  issued by the 
AOGC on August  16, 1939, that suspended the pendi ng schedule of prod uction 
allowables and "shut down" all produci ng wells in the controlled  fields.  The 
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Emergency Order was ostensi bly to determine i f ph ysical  waste was  occurring in 
the fields and if some well were incapable of making their well allowables.  The 
Order did recite that the AOGC  had  been previ ously peti tioned  to refrain from 
reducing allowables to retard  the decl ine in reservoi r pressure because the 
industry was in a period  of "high oi l consumption." 1 24   Moreover,  at a subsequent 
hearing to be held  on the emergency Order the AOGC  was to hear evidence on 
the "bona fide ratable outlet" for oil and gas in the various controlled  fields for 
the forthcomi ng months.  The val idity of the emergency Order was ul timately 
upheld  by  the Arkansas  Supreme Court  in Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Bailey' 25  that 
held that authori ty of the Commission  to issue emergency orders without  first 
having a hearing did not violate the due process clauses of the State or Federal 
Constitutions.   Al though  the case never mentioned  market  demand prorationi ng 
or the AOGC 's general  authority to prevent  waste, it has been cited  for the 
proposi tion that a conservation  agency has the implied  right to engage in market 
demand  prorationi ng pursuant  to its general  statutory authori ty to prevent 
waste. 1 26 
The traditional  common purchaser  or ratable take statutes that  complement 
prorat ioning statutes in many conservation  acts to ensure that non-uniform  rates 
of production by wells in the common source of supply to prevent  waste and 
protect  correlative rights is absent from Act  105.  Instead, Act  I 05 defines waste 
to include the "abuse of correlative ri ghts of each owner of oil and gas in a 
common reservoir due to nonuniform,  disprop01iionate, and unratable 
withdrawals  causing undue drainage between  tracts of land."127   Consequently, 
the AOGC  can make rules and regulations to prevent  the waste or violation  of 
correlative rights by non-uniform  withd rawals but it is not authorized  to compel 
purchasers to take and purchase ratabl y from all wells in the common  source of 
supply.  The AOGC 's authority to compel the pu rchaser to take ratably is 
doubtful. 128 
d.  Well Spacing and Limiting the Density of Drilling:  The Drilling 
Unit and its Subsequent Evolution 
The most significant  and far-reaching addition to the conservation  of oil and 
gas made by the new Act  is its well-spaci ng scheme.  To avoid excess density of 
drilling, with its  unnecessary  and uneconomical  wells 129  the Act established 
"drilling units" that permitted  one wel l  in the common source of supply for each 
drilling u nit. 1 30   Drilling units were to be established by determini ng the 
maxi mum area that  one well would  "efficiently and economically" drain based  on 
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the geologic and  and engineeri ng characteristics of the reservoi r.  The standard 
of "efficient and economic" drainage applied in well  spacing has often been 
misunderstood.   The element of "economic drainage" in the standard is to permit 
adoption of wider spacing regulations, creating larger units, for deeper, more 
costly wells to ensure development  of the reservoir.  A field requi ring deep 
expensive wells may not be economicall y feasible to develop on a tight spacing 
pattern that employs smaller drilling units that permits more wells to be dri lled in 
the field.  The accumulated  cost of dri lling numerous  expensive wells on smaller 
drill ing units may ward  off the investment  required  to develop the field. 
Al though Act  105 employed  the maxi mu m  are of efficient and economic 
drainage to determine the drilling unit size for optimum  reservoi r development, it 
prohi bi ted the AOGC  from creating a drilling unit for oi l larger than 40 acres. 1 l 1 
Thus, the legislatu re was willing to modify the rule of capture to alleviate the evils 
of excess density of dri ll ing so long as the well-spaci ng pattern  for oil  was no 
grreater than 40 acres regardless  of whether the efficient and economic 
drainage test dictated a wider well-spaci ng pattern.  The 40 acre u ni t size 
limitation as a ceiling on well density lasted u ntil it was repealed  in  1951 . 1 32 
The early drill ing units established  by the AOGC adopted the Texas 
method  of well  spacing by enforcing the prescribed  density pattern by limiting the 
distance that the operator could dri ll a well  from existing wells or prope1iy 
boundary  lines. 1ll   F01iunatel y, the AOGC very early adopted the practice of 
fashioning drilling units as squares and rectangles  that correspond  to the 
rectangular  system oflegal descriptions  of land that applies exclusively in 
Arkansas.  Thus, a 640-acre spacing involves drilling units composed  of 
governmental sections,  160-acre spacing involves drill ing uni ts composed  of 
quaiier sections, 80-acre spacing involves drilling units based  on half-quaiier 
sections,  40-acre spacing  involves  drill ing  units  composed  of  quarter-quarter 
sections, and  10-acre spacing  involves  quarter-quarter-quarter  sections. 1 34   The 
Act requi red  the well  to be located  at the center of the drilling unit  unless 
geologic disadvantage  or topographical  conditions, including  surface 
improvements,  prevented  dri ll ing  at that  location. ll 5   Later, the AOGC permi tted 
dri ll ing anywhere within the uni t not prohibited  by an external set back  location 
restriction. 1 3 6    In the event that surface topographical  features prohibited  drilling 
at a prescribed  location, an exception  location  that permitted  an off-pattern  well 
cou ld be authorized  with a penal ty in the form of a lower well allowable to avoid 
any drainage attributed to the off-pattern wel l. 137 
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The well-spaci ng scheme of the  1939 Act also protects the correlat ive 
rights of the mineral  owners who produce form the dri lling units that overlay the 
reservoi r.  The Act  specifically incorporates  the "just and equitable share" 
principle. 138  Subject to reasonable measu res to prevent  waste, the producer's just 
and equitable share of the reservoi r is the amount of prod uction "which is 
substantially in the proportion  that the quantity of recovera ble oil and gas in the 
developed  area of the prod ucers tract in the pool  bears to the recoverable  oil and 
gas in the total developed  area of the pool, in so far as that amount can be 
practicall y ascertained." 139 The correlative rights of the prod ucer  in the drill ing 
uni t is further protected  in that the AOGC  cannot requ ire the prod ucer to drill 
unnecessary  wells to recover his just  and equitable share. 140  More importantly, the 
AOGC  must protect  the drilling unit from net uncompensated  drainage unless 
offset protection  wells,  in add iti on to the drilli ng unit well, have been  dri lled on 
the u nit to protect  against  drainage. 141 
For many years, the drilling units established by the AOGC were 
"production units."  Before the AOGC  had jurisdiction  to establish drilling units - 
a common  source of supply - a reservoir had  to be discovered.   The AOGC 
required  a pa1iy drilling a discovery well  in the reservoi r to appear before the 
agency and seek field rules, which  established  drilling units, withi n six months of 
completion  of the discovery well or before three  prod ucing wells were drilled  in 
the reservoi r, whichever  occurred  first. 142   The "field rules" establ i sh a drilli ng 
uni t or u ni ts for the applicants'  completed  well  or wells and also for direct and 
offsets to the newly established producti ve drilling units.  The practice is a 
modified  well-by-well  approach to establishi ng drilling u nits. 
Exploratory  drilling units were authorized  by legislative amendment to the 
Act  in  1985. 143   An exploratory  drilling unit must be comprised of a governmental 
section or its equivalent and must be prospecti ve of oil or gas, or both. 144  When 
50% of working  interest  owners or unleased  mineral  owners from the proposed 
unit area agree to pool, the AOGC has authority to integrate the remaini ng non- 
consenting working interest  owners or unleased mineral  owners. 1 45    The 
established  exploratory drilling uni t, along with the right of forced integration,  is 
limited to a period  of one year from the date of the order, or alternatively, one 
year from the cessation  of unit drilling or prod uction  from operations. 146   The 
primary benefit  of the add ition of the exploratory  drill ing uni t is that  it provided 
the remedy of forced integration  to assist in the leasing of exploratory projects. 
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From  1939 to the advent of the Fayettevi lle Shale Play in 2004, the oil and 
gas prod uction regulated  by the Act and the AOGC was from conventional 
reservoi rs.  The administration  of the Act by the AOGC  during this lengthy 
period  refl ects Justice Holme's admonition  that "the l i fe of the law has not been 
logic: it has been  experience." 147   Moreover, the AOGC's practices  in establishi ng 
dril ling units  is a classic exampl e of the diversity that exists in state regulation  of 
oi l and gas prod uction under conservation  acts. 1 48   The Arkansas well-spaci ng 
scheme is sui generis, unique in the oil and gas regulatory world.  The rationale 
underl ying the Arkansas  experience i n administeri ng the Act 's well-spacing 
scheme, harking back to the political  struggle to adopt the Act and subve1i the 
common  law rul e of capture, was expressed by the aphorism "one cup, one 
straw." 1 49   This has sometimes been expressed  as the unwritten  "Rule of One." 1 50 
Fundamental  fairness, as well  as equal  opportu nity, dictated that each drilling uni t 
is only entitled  to one well  in the reservoi r.  Accompanyi ng the one cup, one 
straw proposition  was the view that  i f a prod ucer shouldered the risk and paid  for 
its share of the cost of a producing well, the AOGC  was not going to meddle with 
the configuration  of the drilling unit by deleting a tract  from the uni t or otherwise 
diluting the ownership interest.   This proposition  was known  in Arkansas  as the 
principle of "vested rights." 1 51    Strict adherence to the Rule of One also obviated 
the need to deal with vested  rights issues resul ting from either downsizing  or re- 
forming established  and developed  drilling units. 
The AOGC  also adhered to the rectangles  and squares on the surface of the earth 
that corresponded  with the rectangular  survey system of legal  descriptions to 
draw the drilling units. 1 52   The AOGC  eschewed drawing geologic units whose 
surface u nit  boundaries  corresponded  with  the boundaries of the subsurface 
reservoi r. 1 53   The eight-inch well bores of the ve1iical produci ng wells in the 
reservoir provided  insufficient  direct evidence of the porosity, permeability,  and 
size of the prod uctive sand to delineate with  confidence the subsurface 
boundaries  of the reservoi r.  Moreover,  when the field rules for the reservoi r were 
establ ished, there were too few prod ucing wells in the reservoi r to provide the 
well control  necessary  for the formation  of geologic units.  Not  only would the 
AOGC  not fashion geologic units,  it would also not gerrymander  the 
configuration  of the drilling units on the surface i n an attempt more closely to 
approximate the geographic confines of the sub-surface reservoi r.  The AOGC 
would  not cross section lines or quarter section lines in the configuration  of the 
drilling units.   The objective was uni form-sized  drilling u ni ts, fo1iuitously 
arranged  on the basis of the rectangular  survey system of legal  descriptions,  in an 
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orderly pattern that spanned  the developed  field and avoided the presence of 
"windows." 1 54 
In the early days of the Act, the non-associated  gas fields of the Arkoma 
Basin in north  Arkansas were developed  on 640 acre drilling u nits. 1 55   The 640- 
acre drilling u ni ts were based  on the AOGC's determi nation that 640 acres was 
the area that one well would  economically  and efficientl y drain.  Over the course 
of time, 640-acre drilling units, based  on governmental  sections, became the norm 
for gas drilling u ni ts in north Arkansas.   As older fields matured  and greater 
knowledge of the geology of the gas fields accumulated, 1 56  doubts existed as to 
whether one-u ni t well was efficientl y and economical ly draining the u nits. 1 57 
Nevertheless,  the Rule of One reigned  supreme in Arkansas  and increased  density 
of drilling; permitting "infi ll" drilling in the large units was not an option. 
Evidence that the existing unit well was not economicall y and efficientl y draining 
the drilling u ni t would  not elicit an additional  u nit well from the AOGC.  An 
additional well  in a drilling unit would be authorized only if the appl icant could 
prove that the second well would produce a reservoi r separate and distinct from 
the reservoir  of the unit wel l. 1 58   Unl ike Oklahoma, there is no case law or statute 
in Arkansas that permi tted modification  of an AOGC order establishi ng drilling 
units due to the subsequent  acquisition of geological  data that signaled a change 
of cond ition in the reservoi r. 1 59 
The inabi lity to drill infi ll wells to recover gas not being drained by the unit 
and problems  in establishing separation of reservoirs, when reservoi rs were 
sometimes vertically stacked and underlay  a 640-acre drill ing uni t, made a 
mockery of the Rule of One's well-spaci ng regulations. 1 6° Consequentl y, in 2003, 
the legislature amended the well-spacing  regulations. 1 61   The amendment  created 
a statutory presu mption  in favor of a 640-acre u nit composed of a governmental 
section, though  it permitted  the AOGC to establish  a larger or smaller unit.  The 
AOGC is specifically authorized  to permit  additional wells in the u nit and 
regulate the spacing between the multipl e-unit wells. 1 62   Deleted from the Act is 
the requi rement, u niversally recognized  by oi l and gas conservation  lawyers and 
academicians, that drilling units be established  on the basis of the maximu m area 
. that one well  would  efficiently and economicall y drain.  Statutory guidance to the 
AOGC on the parameters  to be used  in drawing dri ll ing uni ts no longer appears in 
the Act.  One may infer that the legislature,  adopting the norm of the 640-acre 
square mile unit as the presumpti ve standard, intended by implication  for the 
AOGC to apply a standard of "reasonableness" in fashioning drilling units under 
the amended  Act. 
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Regard less of the theory that underl ies the presumption  of a 640-acre, or square 
mile, statutory unit, the practice before the AOGC on well spacing in the north 
Arkansas  gas fields had radically changed.  As opposed to hearing evidence on 
the acreage that a single well would  economicall y and efficiently drain, the 
AOGC hears evidence on the "most effective and efficient manner of locating 
multiple wells for the effective, but cost efficient, removal  of the maximum 
amou nt of oi l and gas from a square mile u nit." 1 63   The emphasis is on economic 
efficiency based  on the geologic characteristics  of the reservoi r.  One may argue 
that economic efficiency is not foreign to the tradi tional formula  of maxi mu m 
area of economic and efficient drainage, and, thus, the change in the standard in 
Arkansas  is not necessaril y profou nd.  Whatever one think of the dearth of the 
statutory standards for delineating drilling units, i t is di fficul t to argue that the 
amendment  is not an improvement  over the Rule of One. 
The AOGC  draws perspecti ve drilling u ni ts for the Fayettevi lle Shale 
and other unconventi onal gas reservoi rs i n Arkansas.   Each governmental 
section i n each county in which  the Fayettevi lle is know n or thought  to exist is 
covered  on a county-by-cou nty basis. i c,4    The dri ll ing uni ts in the counti es are 
l abel ed as either "exploratory drilling u ni ts" or "established  dri lling u ni ts," the 
latter bei ng prod uction uni ts.  Once a prod ucing well  has been  completed  on 
an  expl oratory uni t, that u nit, and the offset u ni ts contiguous to it, become 
prod ucti on uni ts. 165 
Sixteen vertical  or hori zon tal wells, or a combination  thereof, may be 
dri lled  in an exploratory dri lling unit. 166  For vertical  wells, that amounts to a 
forty-acre spacing pattern.   For horizontal  wells, even though  sixteen is 
permi tted , the external  and  internal  uni t well-locati on restricti ons have the 
potential  to allow six to eight horizontal  wells  in the unit.  The in ternal  well- 
location restri ction requi res multipl e wells  in the u ni t to be spaced 448 feet 
apart  with an a llowed  20% variance. 1 67    This restriction may be wai ved by 
obtaini ng wri tten consent from all uni t work ing interest  owners. 168  The 
external  well-locati on restriction,  designed to protect  other dril ling u ni ts from 
drainage, requi res all wells to be set back  a d istance of 560 feet from any unit 
bou ndary  l ine or any other drill ing u n it 's well. 1 69    Exception  locati on wells 
may be granted by the AOGC  for topographical  or geologic advantage 
reasons. 1 70    The 560-foot setback  creates a buffer zone of  1 ,120 feet that 
extends around  any dri lling unit. 
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Horizontal  wells are dri lled verticall y and then tu rn on a tight rad iu s 
before proceed ing horizo n tally through the gas-beari ng strata.  The well  bore 
for a horizontal  wel l is defined by the AOGC ru les as the entire perforated 
length of the lateral  section of the horizontal  wel l. 1 71    Consequ ently, based  on 
that  definition, a horizonta l wel l invol ves a long narrow  cylinder  of a 
producing reservoi r.  The cylinders may be arranged  in such a fashion to 
achieve effecti ve and cost-efficient  drainage of the reservoi r. 172 
The AOGC permi ts horizontal  wells to extend  into more than  one dril ling 
unit when  the majori ty in interest  of worki ng interest  owners seeks 
authorization  from the Commissi on and voluntari ly agrees to the allocation of 
costs and the proceeds  form prod ucti on. 173   Ad ministrati ve approval  of the 
"cross u ni t" well  by the Di rector of the AOGC, which  avoids a heari ng and a 
decision by the Commissi on, is authorized  i f the affected dri lling units have 
been previ ously integrated . 174   The costs and proceeds  of prod ucti on for the 
"cross uni t" well  are allocated by drawing a "cyl indri cal u ni t" around  the 
perforated  well  bore.  The costs and proceed s shared between  each 
pa rticipati ng dri ll ing uni t are based  on the proportion  of the cyl ind ri cal uni t (the 
calcu lated area) that  i s located  in each such dri ll ing uni t. 175    The cylindrical unit 
is drawn  by divi d ing a circle with a rad i u s of 560 feet at both the 
begi nning poi nt and the end ing point of the perforated  lateral well  bore and 
inserting a rectangle  560 feet in wi dth on both  sides of the perforated 
horizontal  lateral. 176   It should be noted  that the cylindrical  u nit is not a formal 
"dri ll ing unit" under the Arkansas  well-spaci ng regime, bu t is merel y a basis 
for allocati ng costs and proceeds  of prod ucti on from cross unit wells. 
Permi tting horizontal  wells to extend into, or encroach upon, adjoi ni ng 
drilling units faci litates the prod uction  of gas situated  in the  1 120-foot  buffer 
zone that are designed to protect  against drainage and are situated  between  the 
productive areas of the dri l ling u nits.  Otherwise, the gas wou ld be stranded 
and optimu m development  of the reservoi r would  be precluded. 
e.  Forced  Integration 
Compulsi on by the state to achieve pooli ng when the parties  failed to 
volu ntaril y pool  was a controversi al matter in  1939.  The state's medd ling with 
property  rights to the extent that  it cou ld compel  a mi neral  owner to parti cipate 
in a dri ll ing venture, committi ng its share of the minerals  in the reservoi r to the 
project  and imposi ng recovery  of the prorata  share of costs, in the absence of 
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consent, was vi ewed with  much  skept icism.  The state of Texas, always the 
largest oi l and gas prod ucer in the lower 48, didn 't enact a compu lsory pooli ng 
statute u nt i l  1965. 1 77   Kansas doesn 't yet  have such a statute.  N everthel ess, the 
inabi lity of worki ng  interest  owners to force integrate pro vi ded non-co nsent ing 
part ies undue leverage to  exact unfai r terms in the negot iat ion of the vol untary 
pool ing agreemen t.   Moreover,  in the absence of forced  integrat ion, the refu sal 
to volu ntari ly pool  by intra nsi gent non-consent ing wo rki ng  interest  owner or 
unl eased mi neral  owners could bar development  of society 's valuabl e natu ral 
resou rces. 
Arkansas  was progressi ve in adopti ng forced  integra tion  in the  1939 Act. 
Reciting the policy  of  preventi ng waste and avoiding the dri lling of 
unnecessary  wells, the Act provi ded that  when  work ing  interest  owners or 
unleased  mineral  owners in two or more separately owned  t racts located  with in 
a dri ll ing uni t fai l to volu ntari ly pool, the AOGC  shall integrate  their interest  so 
that the dri ll ing unit  can be developed. 1 7s  The terms  of the ma ndated 
integrat ion must  be just  and reasona ble, provi de each  integrated  party  the 
opportun ity to recover their fair share of the reservoi r wi thout  u nnecessary 
expense and avoid  net  uncompensated  drainage. 179 
Despite the spirit of enl ightenment  that  included  forced  integration  in the 
1939 Act, the system impl emented  by the statute was flawed.   The party  who 
integrated  the non-consent ing  in terest to dri ll the unit  well  recovered  the 
integrated  party 's share of the development  costs (drill ing, completing and 
operating  costs) from the integrated  party 's share of the unit  prod uctio n. 1 so 
Wit h the exception  of permitti ng the developi ng mi neral  owner to recover  a 
reasonable  charge for supervision  from the integrated  party,  the scheme is 
identical to the account ing applied  to the developing   and   non-consent ing co- 
tenants  under the Statute of Anne. 1 s 1    The integrati ng party  fronts the integrated 
pa rty 's share of the development  costs and only recovers  those costs from the 
latter 's share of prod uctio n. In the event the well  is a dry hol e or a marginal 
well  that never pays out, the integrat ing  party  bears  the risk  of loss on the 
carried  interest 's share of the well  costs.  The integrated  party is a "carried 
interest" who  gets a free ride down the wel l bore.   The integrat ing pa rty is not 
compensated  for assuming the risk  of loss. 
It was   unsound  to apply the Statute of Anne standard of accounting 
applicable to developi ng and  non-co nsenti ng co-tenants to forced  integrat ion 
under the Conservati on Act.   Placing the risk  of loss for development  on the 
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integrati ng party provided  no incenti ve for the non-co nsen t ing work ing interest 
owner or u n leased m ineral  owner to volu n taril y pool pu rsua n t to a pl an of 
devel opment  that requi red  pa yi ng their proportio nate share of the costs of 
development and pa rtici pating in the risk.  Refusing to pool  and going forced 
integrati on, avoi d ing the loss of investment  on the dry hol e or unprofita bl e 
well, and bei ng carried  on a profita bl e  prod u cing wel l by  I 00% of the share of 
the costs to be  recovered  from prod ucti on, wasn 't a bad  deal. 
The legislatu re made sweeping changes to forced  integration  i n  I 963.182 
Overall , the free ride down the well  for the carried  interest  was bu rdened  wi th a 
risk  factor penal ty to  compensate the parti cipati ng interests  for beari ng the risk 
of loss.  A choice wi th options was provi ded for the integrated  parties.   The 
unleased  mi neral  owners who elected the carri ed interest  status were accorded  a 
statutory  1/8 royal ty du ring the pay out period. 
Forced  Integration  in Arka nsas today, reflecti ng the  1963 Amend men t, 
can be simply described. If the parties  do not agree to pool  voluntari ly, the 
AOGC, upon  the application  of any mineral  owner or oi l and  gas J essee, is 
requi red  to force integrate all tracts and  interests  for u n i t devel opment. 1 83    The 
integrati on order authorizes the dri lling, completion,  equ ipping and operation 
of the well  on the uni t 1 84  and designates the operator of the wel l. 1 85 
The unleased  mineral  owner has choices under the integrati on order. 1 86 
She may elect to be "leased" in which  she receives a competi tive royal ty, but 
not  less than  a  I /8th share, plu s a bonus  based  on a "reasonable considerati on" 
to be determined by the AOGC. 1 87    Al ternatively, she may elect to participate in 
the well, payi ng her proportionate  share of the well  costs and  taking her 
proportionate  share of  revenues  attributable to her proportionate  share of the 
prod ucti on. 1 88    Having paid  her well  costs up front, she takes her share of the 
risk  by parti cipating in the wel l.  Another option  is  to go "non-consent" and be 
"carried" by the participati ng owners who pay her share of the costs that are 
subsequentl y, i f ever, recovered  from her proportionate  share of the revenues 
attributable to her proportionate  share of the prod uctio n. 1 89    Because the 
partici pati n g owners are taking the risks of her  share of the costs, the AOGC 
will assess a "risk factor" penal ty against the carried interest  based  on the 
geologic risk. 1 90    The risk  factor penal ty is usually 400% , bei ng her 
proportionate  share of the well  costs times  four (4) unless  the prospect  involves 
extraord inary risk, which wi ll enhance the risk  factor penalty. 191  Once payout 
occurs, the costs and risk-factor  penalty  are recovered  from her share of the 
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revenues,  the non-co nsen t ing party reco vers her proportio nate share of the 
prod uction. 1 92 Additionall y, the Act  generousl y accords the non-consent ing 
u n l eased mineral  owner a  l/8 royal ty share pend ing payou t. 1 93    Finally, if the 
unl eased mi neral  owner fails to make an election, she wi ll be deemed  to be 
leased. 1 94 
The work ing  interest  owner - the lessee who hol ds an oi l  and  gas l ease 
from a mineral  owner  in the u n it - may partici pate  in the dri ll ing of the well  by 
payi ng i ts share of the costs or by elect ing to go nonconsent. 1 95    If the worki ng 
interest  owner fails to specify i ts elect ion, it is deemed  to  have elected  to go 
non-consent. 196 
Once the AOGC  promul gates an integrat ion  order for a dri ll ing u nit, all 
operati ons on any part  of the u nit, including dri l ling or operat ion  of a well, are 
deemed to be as i f the operat ions were conducted  on each  separately owned 
tract  and  interest  in  the dri l ling u n it. 1 97    Likewise,  prod uct ion  from any pa rt of 
the dri lling uni t  shall be deemed  to be prod u ct ion from every tract  or interest 
located  in the unit. 1 98    I n effect, the Act  d ictates that  the integrati on order has 
the same effect  on oi l  and gas lease terms,  includi ng the secondary term 
requ i rement  of prod uct ion  in the habendum clause,  as to the voluntary pooli ng 
of the lease interests. 1 99 
f.  Compulsor y  Unitizita tion 
Act  105 of  1939 did  not provi de for compu lsory u nit izat ion.  The 
consequence  of the omission of compulsory uni t izat ion from the Conservation 
Act  was  high lighted  by subsequent  events that  occurred  in the McKa mike 
Patton  Field.  The field, discovered  in  1940 and  covered  5000 acres, 
experienced  a preci pitous  drop of reservoi r pressure  in the late  l 940's.   Some 
operators in the field promoted  a voluntaril y unitization  plan  for gas re- 
inject ion to enhance the reservoi r pressure  to avoid substant ial  l oss of oil and 
gas reserves.   Even  though  the plan  of voluntary unit ization was executed  by 
97% of the worki ng  interest  and  96% of the royalty  owners, it fai led due to the 
hol d out of the minority  interests.   The AOGC,  upon  pet ition by the proponents 
of the voluntary plan,  issued  an Order requi ri ng u nitizat ion.  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court in Dodson  v. Ark.  Oil and  Gas Comm 'n,200  invalidated  the 
AOGC 's Order, hol ding that  the agency had  no ju risdi ction to compel  field 
wide unit izat ion. 
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Shortly thereafter,  Act  134 of  195,201  added  a compulso ry u n itizati on 
provision  to the Conservation  Act.  The Act  req u i res, inter alia , tha t the AOGC 
mu st determi ne the following criteri a is satisfied before issui ng an Order 
requ iring compu lsory u ni tizati on: 75% of the worki ng in terest  and royalty and 
overriding royal ty interests  from the total  proposed  uni t area have executed the 
agreement; 202  the uni t operation  is reasona bly necessary  to prevent  waste, 
increase ul timate recovery  of oi l and  gas, and protect  the correlati ve rights;2°3 
and that the value of the additional  oi l to be recovered  from the proposed  unit 
operati on wi ll exceed the add itional cost incident  to conducti ng the 
operation. 204 
The Act further requi res that the AOGC 's Order be "fair and 
reasona bl e"205  and, inter alia , the  parti cipation  formu la mu st prov ide that  each 
separately owned  tract wi ll receive its fair share of the productio n of the u n i t 
area.206    The Act speci fically proh ibi ts the AOGC  from adopting or 
implemen ting an al l ocation formu la that  is not based  on the relative 
contribu ti on, exclu sive of the prod uction  equipment, made by each separately 
owned  tract. 207 
A postscri pt on the Schu l er Field makes  a salient point on fieldwide 
unitization.   The statement on the Shuler Fiel d is from Kramer and Marti n 's 
excellent treatise on The Law of Pooling and Uni tizatio n: 208 
A classi c exampl e of the success of pressu re maintenance by the 
injecti on of gas and water was the Shuler Field  i n Union County, 
Arkansas.   This field was discovered  in  1937 and u ni tized  four 
years later.  Had the field been  unitized  at the time of its discovery 
or soon thereafter,  the dri lling of seventy-one wells cou ld have 
been  avoided.  Duri ng the four years  of primary operation, bi ll ions 
of cubi c feet of rich gas were vented  into the air.  Prior to 
unitization, the field prod uced  a total  of approxi matel y  16 Y:, 
mi l lion barrels  of oi l with a drop of reservoi r pressu re from  3,548 
pou nds to  1 ,625 pou nds or a di fference of  1 ,923 pou nds. Thus, 
during the those four years, 55 percent  of the vital  reservoi r 
pressure was expended  in the production  of  1 1 percent  of the total 
oi l in pl ace. 
During the first eight years of operation u nder the unitization  plan,  30 
milli on barrels  of additional  oil was produced  with a pressure  drop of 
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on ly  185 pou nds. Under primary prod uction operati on the field would 
have l ong since been  exhau sted , whereas, by late as  1954 it was still 
produci ng wel l over 5,500 barrels of oi l per day.  Through January  1, 
1953, the field had prod uced  over 7 1 mi l lion barrels of oil.  The 
estima ted recovery as a resu l t of unitized  operati ons is approxi mately  I 00 
mi ll ion ba rrels of oil, a recovery to close to 90 percent  of the oi l i n place. 
The uni tiza tion of a field that shows promise for a pressu re mai ntenance 
project  should be impl emented  as early as possi ble after discovery to maximize 
ultimate recovery  form the reservoi r.  The sooner the beetler is the lesson to be 
learned  from the Shuler Field. 
Conclusion 
Arkansas'  modern  Oi l and Gas Conservati on Act, comprisi ng Act  I 05 
and its major amend ments, has been  successfu l i n regu lating oi l and  gas 
production  to eliminate economic   and physical  waste.   Reservoi rs discovered 
subseq u ent to Act  I 05 have been  controlled  and well  spacing and MER 
prorati on ing have elimina ted  the  excessive  densi ty of dril ling and rates of 
producti on that occasioned  so much  economic and physi cal waste du ring the 
era of uncontroll ed prod uctio n.  A  fair and bal anced  statutory remedy  of forced 
integratio n has blu n ted the abi l ity of non-consen ting interests to impede the 
dri l ling of  exploratory and development wells.   Well  spacing and forced 
integration  have provi ded the framework  for the oi l and gas dri ll ing transaction 
i n Arkansas.  The established  exploratory u ni t or dri ll ing u ni t has provided 
certainty as to the location and  geographic extent of the area of the prospect. 
Force integration  has established  the relative rights  of the worki ng interests  and 
mineral  and royal ty in terest  within the uni t Uni tized  reservoi rs and fields are not 
uncom mon  in South Arkansas,  either as an early in the life of the field pressu re 
maintenance projects   or as belated  secondary recovery  operations. 
The producti ve life of the field or reservoi r is extended and recovery  is 
enhanced.  Compulsory  unitiza tion either created the u ni tized  project  or its 
threat  facilitated its creation by voluntary  uni tization 
The Conservation  Act proved  sufficiently flexible to accommodate  state 
regu lation of production  from  uncon ventional  reservoi rs in Arkansas.   The 
Act 's ample rule mak ing authori ty vested  in the AOGC, which  was exercised 
wisel y by the agency, permi tted the imposi tion of rules to govern the regu lation 
of the development  of the Fayetteville  Shale deposi tion.  The AOGC 's state 
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wide rules for Fayettevi lle Shale development accommodated  hori zon tal 
drill ing and hydraulic  fractu ring (fracing) that proved   necessary  to 
economicall y compl ete Fayettev i l le Shale wells.  Approxi matel y 5000 pl u s 
wells, mostly hori zontal ,, have been  completed and are prod uci ng in the B-43 
area.  As a consequence, Arka nsas is the 8111  l argest prod ucer  of natu ral gas i n 
the Uni ted  States.209 
So there i s much  success to attribu te to Act  I 05 and post-1 939 oi l and 
gas  conservati on.  However, the pre-1939  losses occasioned  by waste still 
casts a deep shadow over the industry in Arka nsas.   The Smackover Fiel d, 
d iscovered  in  1922, was Arka nsas ' "giant" oi l and gas field , spanni ng in excess 
of 25,000 acres.21 0  At  its peak  year of prod ucti on, in  1925, it was the leading oil 
prod ucing field  in the worl d.21 1  The sheer amou nt of oi l wasted,  most  being 
attributed  to undergrou nd  waste resul ting from depletion  of gas pressu re, was 
enormou s.  O.C. Bai ley, in  1938, opined that one bi ll ion barrels  of recovera ble 
reserves  were l eft behind  in the Smackover Field, as a consequence of waste. 212 
Basically, the Smackover Field  was ruined. 
It is di fficu lt to fault the pio neer opera tors in the early   l 920's that were 
committing the waste.   They were ignorant as to associ ated  oil and gas 
reservoi r mechanics and the efficient  rates of prod uction  and  pressu re 
maintenance pri nciples that were pioneered  by the early petrol eum engineers. 
The truth  of the matter  is that Arka nsas ' misfort une with  Smackover and the 
smaller oi l fields discovered  i n the  I 920's was  based  on fortu itous 
circu mstances.   The field was discovered  prior to the development  of efficient 
reservoi r management  to avoid undergrou nd waste by the science of petroleu m 
engineering.  The Smackover Field tu rned  out to be the indu stry's lesson on 
how not to do it for the bi g discoveri es of the late  1920's and early  1930's. 
Consequentl y, in Arka nsas, the ubiqui tous language  in the modern 
parlance  of oil and gas conservation," prevent  waste and protect  correl ative 
rights", the cornerstone of Act  105, is not  simply a reci tation  of theory,  it is our 
experi ence.  The loss in the early  1920's of  I  bi l lion barrels  of oi l producti on to 
the future economy of the State of Arkansas  has not been  a small price to pay. 
The tragic legacy of the Smackover Field is "indeli bly woven  into the fabric of 
conservati on and controlled  production  history."21 3 
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(E) other dissipation,  production,  or use of oil or gas underground  or above ground, or in 
storage, that  is careless, needless, or without  valuable resul t. 
1 0 
Wallace F. Lovejoy and Paut T. Homan,  Economic Aspects  of Oil Conservation  Regulation, 
121 (1967). 
1 1 
For a extended  discussion of reservoir mechanics  relating to production,  see,   , The 
Origin, OccmTence and Production  of Oil, 8-32, in Oil.for  Today - and .for  Tomorrow, Interstate 
Oil Compact Commission  (1953) 
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1 2 
"Efficient recovery of the oil from a reservoir  is not taken care of by chance; it may be fulfilled 
only through  careful and deliberate action by the producers.   Experience has shown that one of 
the most  essential  factors in meeting these requi rements  is control of the rate of production. 
Excessive rates of withdrawal  lead to rapid  decline of reservoir pressure, to release of dissol ved 
gas, to irregularity of the boundary between  invaded  and non-i nvaded  sections of the reservoir, to 
dissipation of gas and water,, to trapping and by-passi ng of oil, and, in extreme cases, to 
complete loss of demarcation between the invaded and non-i nvaded p011ions of the reservoir, 
with dominance of the entire recovery by inefficient  dissolved -gas drive. Each of these effects of 
excessive withdrawal  rates reduces the ultimate recovery  of oil.  The Origin, Occurrence and 
Production of Oil, p. 31, in Oil.for  Today - and .for  Tomorro1v, Interstate Oil Compact 
Commission  ( 1953) 
1 3 
J. Scott Parker, A Changing Landscape:  Environmental  Conditions and Consequences of the 
1920s Union  Oil County Booms, ARK. HIST. Q. Vol. 60 No.  !, p. 38 (Spring 2001 ). 
14 
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,  190 U.S.  177 (1900), a United  States Supreme Com1decision, is 
generally considered  to be the fount of the correlative rights doctrine.  The case involved  an 
expansive gas field which  encompassed  some areas that produced  oil associated  with gas. 
Indiana had a statute that prohibited  the emission of gas from wells into the open air.  The 
defendant , Ohio Oil Co., was prod ucing oil from the associated  oil and gas area of the field and 
was emitting the gas into the open air.  The plaintiff,  the State of Indiana, sought  to enjoin the 
defendant from emitting the gas in violation of the statute.  The defendant alleged that the gas 
was being used  to lift the prod uced  oil to the surface and that the oil could not be produced 
without emitting the gas.  Likewise, the prod uced  oil had more value than the gas lost at the 
surface.  Plaintiff  alleged that the natural  gas from the fields was used  for fuel and light for 
numerous  municipalities  in the area and that the emitting of gas into the open air wasted  the gas 
and decreased the supply for the municipalities.   Fmiher, the plaintiff alleged the defendant 's 
emitting the of the gas was reducing the "back pressure" that was preventing  salt water 
encroachment  in the  reservoir.   The defendant argued  that the enforcement  of the statute would 
shut down his oil prod uction and would constitute a taking of his property in violation of due 
process.   Justice White, in the Supreme Cou11's opinion affinning the trial  court's  issuance of 
the injunction, observed: 
1 5 
"These existing property relations, called the coITelative rights of the owners of the land in the 
common  source of supply, were not created by statute, but held to exist because of the peculiar 
physical  facts of oil and gas.  The tenn "coITelative rights" is merel y a convenient method  of 
indicating that each owner of lands in a common  source of supply of oil and gas has legal 
privileges as against other owners of the land therein to take oil or gas therefrom  by lawful 
actions conducted  on his land; that each such owner has duties to the other owners not to exercise 
his privileges  of taking so as to injure the common  source of supply; and that each such owner 
has rights that other owners not exercise thei r pri vileges of taking so as to injure the common 
source of supply.   1 Walter L. Summers, § 63. 
16 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.,  146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d  558 (Tex.  1948). 
1 7 3 Eugene Kuntz, supra N. 4 at  § 4.7 at 92. 
1 8  Wronski v.  Sun Oil Co., 89 Mich. App.! 1 , 279 N.W.2d  564 (Mich. App.  1979). 
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19  Kramer and Anderson, supra  Note  1 at 6-1 1 . 
20  
The Origin, Occurrence and Production  of Oil , p. 31, in Oil.for Today - and .for  Tomorrow, 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission  (1953) 
21 Id. 
 
22 Wallace F. Lovejoy and Paut T. Homan,  Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation  Regulation, 
26 (1967), citing Erich W. Zimmerman,  Conservation in the Production  of  Petroleum, Yale 
University  Press, p. 24, (New Haven,  1957). 
23  
The primary purpose of a petroleum  conservation  statute is prevent  physical  waste above 
ground and underground  in oil and gas prod uction  operation: however, the due process  and equal 
protection  clauses of the Federal  Constitution,  and usually similar clauses in state constitutions, 
as well  as provision  or provisions  in conservation  statutes, require that the regulation  must 
protect the property rights of those who have the right to produce,  subject to reasonable 
regulation  to prevent  waste.   IOCC Governors'  Special  Study Committee, p. 6, (Oklahoma City, 
1964),  cited  in Lovejoy and Homan, N. 20 at p.27.  The implication  is that "prevention of 
physical  waste appears as the primary aim" of conservation  acts.  Id . 
24 
Stabilization Through Conservation - or was it vice versa? The Oil and Gas Journal, p. A-52- 
A-56, (date unknown). 
25 
George W. Hazlett, Property Rights and Oil Production,  in Oil for Today - and for Toman-ow, 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission 39,40 (1953). 
26  Wallace F. Lovejoy and Paul T. Homan, supra N. 20 at  128. 
27  
52 Oki. St. Ann. 271-280, Though enacted in  1915, the Act wasn't used  until the  1930's. 
2s Id. 
29 
For a discussion of the  1915 Proration  Act and its amendments, see, l  W.L. SUMMERS,   § 
6.15 - 6.19. 
30 Title  102, Revised  Civil Statutes of Texas, Article 6014.   Pursuant  to the Act, Texas defines 
waste as "The production  of crude petroleum  oil in excess of transpo11ation or market  facilities or 
reasonable market  demand." 
31  Wallace F. Lovejoy and Paul T. Homan, supra  N. 20 at  128. 
32 Id. at 203. 
33  Wallace F. Lovejoy and Paul T. Homan, supra N. 20 at  128,  129. 
34 1913 Okla. Sess. Laws  198. 
35  
Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad  Commission,  69 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 609, 1933). 
36 
For a modern treatment  of the Voluntary  Pooling Clause contained in the oil and gas lease, see 
Mitchell  E. Ayer, Navigating  the Pooling  Clause Waters: New and Recurring  Issues,  53 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33-1 (2007). 
33 
 
 
37 4 Eugene Kuntz, supra N.4 at 48.3(2). 
38 4 Eugene Kuntz, supra  N.4 at 48.3(3). 
39  
For a discussion of equitable or judicial  pooling in Arkansas,  see, 4 Bruce M. Kramer and 
Patrick  H. Martin, The Law of Pooling and U nitization,  § 7.02 (3'd Ed. 2001 ). 
40 
3 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 42.5(£) at 41 5-416 (1998). 
41  Id . 
42 
For an exhaustive list ofliteraturc on voluntary unitization,  see I  Bruce E. Kramer and Patrick 
H. M artin, supra  N. 39 at 817.01 at N.1. 
43 
Robert  E. Hardwicke, Antitrust  Laws v. Unit Operation  of Oil or Gas Pool, page  I  to 33, (1948 
Maple Press Co.), provides a general  overview of D0he1iy's  views and activi ties on regulation of 
production  to avoid waste of oil and gas resources. 
44 Id. At 22. 
45 
Owen  L. Anderson, "Mutiny: The Revolt Against Unsuccessful  Unit Operations.  30 Rocky Mt. 
Min. L. Inst. 3-23 (1984). 
46  Id. 
47  
Walace Hawkins, The American  System  10, Oil and Gas Conservation  -  1948, (presented  to 
North Texas Chapter of A.I.M.E., January 5,  1949) (found in AOGC historical  files).  Hawkins 
cited the following comment  from an opponent: "unitized operations  in oil field, which  in fact 
means monopolized  operations,  constitute a unified operating interest whereby everybody but the 
monopolizers  get crucified." 
48 Id at  1 1. 
49  52 Okla. Stat. Ann.  §§ 287. l  to  187.15. 
5° For an abbreviated  version of the industry's  struggle with distressed  crude oil, the formation of 
the Interstate Oil Compact, and the  enactment of comprehensive state oil.and gas conservation 
acts, see Earl  Foster, Maximum  Oil Production  Through Conservation  Laws 70-71, Interstate Oil 
Compact  Commission  (1952).  For a detailed treatment  of the subject, see Robe1i E. Hardwicke, 
Antitrust  Laws v. Unit Operation  of Oil and Gas Pools, The Maple Press Co. (1948). 
51  Hardwicke, supra N.  43 at  15. 
52 Id.  At 22. 
53 W. Henry Rector, Legal  Conservation  of Oil and  Gas Law  in Arkansas; A  Symposium,  in 
LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION  OF OIL AND GAS,  16 (Am. Bar. Ass'n  1938). 
54 Ld._.  at  l 9. 
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5 - 
)Act  166 of March  17,  1917,  1917 Ark. Acts  890. 
56 Id. at §  I. 
57 Id . at § 8. 
58 Id. at § 8. 
Id.  at §  18.  Act  144 of  1921 was  enacted  to prescribe the method  of testing the open  flow 
59 
capacity of the Well.  Act  144 of February  18, 1921,  1921 Ark. Acts 216. 
60 
The purpose of the reduced  flow is explained  in Nowata  Gas Co. v. Henry Oil Co., 269 F. 742, 
748 (8'" Cir.  1920), wherein  the Eight  Circuit Corni of Appeals, discussing   52 Okla. St. Ann.  § 
29, an early Oklahoma  act  that prohibited  the taking of more than 25% of the daily natural  flow 
of gas wells,  stated:  "When natural  gas is pennitted  to flow freely, it tends to drain the gas from 
the underl ying sands in the neighborhood  of the well too rapid ly, with  the result  that the water 
below  the gas sands finds it way up towards the outlet of the gas at the base of the well, cuts off 
the lateral  inflow of the gas, and drowns the well.   If the outflow of gas is under pressure,  and 
lateral  flow towards the well will be more extensive and long continued,  and in the end the gas 
will be more completel y removed  from the gas sands, and the gas field more thoroughly 
exhausted." 
61  Act  166 §  12. 
62 Id. at § 4,5 and  15. 
63 
Act  664  of March  23,  1923, 1923 Ark. Acts  555. 
64 Id . at § I. 
65  Id. at § 2. 
 
66 Jd. at § 16. 
67 Id . at   § 4. 
68 Id.  at § 5. 6. 
69 
The Administration  of the Act was transferred  from the Arkansas Railroad  Commission  to the 
four (4) member  Board  of Conservation  in  1927.  Act 221 of March 23,  1927, 1927  Ark. Acts. 
714. 
70 Id. at § 20. 
71 
Act  1 18 of February  13,  1923,  1923 Ark. Acts 67. 
72  L. L. Jordan, Drake Well Foundation  Symposium, p. 2. 
73  
Act 234 of March 28 of  1933., 1933 Ark. Acts  720. 
74 Ld_. at 2. 
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75 Id . at § 5,6,7. 
76  Id. at § 8, 9,10. 
77 L.d_. at § 4. 
78 
Gerald  Forbes, Brief History of the Petroleum  Industry in Arkansas,  The Arkansas  Historical 
Quaiierly, 28, 36 (March  1942) supra N. At 36. 
79 
Petroleum  Investigation,  Hearing on H.R. 290 and H.R. 7302 Before the Subcomm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong. 971, 1007 (1940) (statement of O.C. Bailey, 
Chairman, Arkansas  Oil and Gas Commission. 
so Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Alce M. Crowell, Rodessa an Object Lesson  in Control, The Oil and Gas Journal, p. 28, 
(September 29,  1938). 
83  Id.  at  105. 
84 
Id . at  I 05.  It has been  suggested that Louisiana's  reservoir performance might have been better 
but for the fact that wells offsetting the Rodessa field in Arkansas were pennitted  to produce  in 
excess of the state's fixed allowables to prevent  drainage from Arkansas'  open flow wells. 
Gerald  Forbes, supra N. 78 at 37. 
85 
Louisiana's reservoir performance  might have been better but  for the fact that off set wells 
from the Rodessa  field in Arkansas  were permitted  to produce  in excess of the state's fixed 
allowables to prevent  drainage from Arkansas'  open flow wells. 
37. 
860.C. Bailey, Petroleum  Investigation, supra N. 79 at  1008. 
87 Gerald  Forbes, supra  N 78 at 38. 
88  Alec M. Crowell, Supra N. 82 at  I 05. 
89 Id. 
90 
O.C. Bailey, Petroleum  Investigation,  Supra N. 79 at  1008. 
91 Gerald  Forbes, Id.  at 37. 
92 
Id.  The Shuler Field  was the first controlled  field in Arkansas. 
Gerald  Forbes, supra N. 78 at 
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93 
Natural  Gas Investigation,  Dock, No.  G-580, (Statement  of O.C. Bailey, Chairman, Arkansas 
Oil and Gas Commission,  p. 2, Federal  Power Commission  (Nov. 26,  1945) 
94 Id. at 2. 
9s Id. 
96 Gerald  Forbes, supra N.  78  at 37. 
97 
Act  I 05 of February 20,  I 939,  1939 Ark. Acts 219.  The  conservation  statutes begi n at § 15- 
72-10 I  of the Arkansas Code. 
98 Id. at  15-71 -107(a)(l ) (1994). 
99 
In  1943, Chainnan Bailey noted  that were  1349 oil wells in controlled  fields and 2422 oil wells 
in uncontrolled  fields.  The daily production  from the controlled  fields far exceeded  the 
production  from the uncontrolled  fields by 64,923 barrels bid  to  16,876 bid .   Heari ng Before the 
Subcomm. on Naval  Affairs, '  Cong. _(  1943) (statement  of O.C. Bailey, Chaimian, 
Arkansas  Oil and Gas Commission. 
7911 
100 Id 
1 01  Id 
at § 15-71-101  (1994d) (Supp. 2009) 
at § 15-71- l J O(d) 
102 
Ark. Code Ann.  § 15-72-103(a)( l ) (Supp. 2009).  Addit ionally, the filing of a false entry or statement 
of fact, or the omission of full, true, and correct  entries, or mutilation or alterat ion of any report or 
transaction,  in an attempt to evade any Arkansas  Oi l and Gas Commission  (AOGC) rule, regulation, or 
order is a misdemeanor and punishable by a $5,000 fine or imprisonment  for six months, or both.  ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 15-72-104(a)(] )-(4) (] 994). 
Ark.  Code Ann.  §  15-72-102 (4)-(6) Supp. 2009) (defining illegal gas, illegal  oil, and illegal 
product).   The penalty  for prod ucing illegal oil or gas is a fine of not more than $2,500 a day for 
each and every act of violation.   Ark. Code Ann.  §  15-72-103(a)(l ). 
104Ark. Code Ann.  §§  15-72-401 (1994) 6. 
1 05
Ark.  Code Ann.  §  15-71-116(a)(l) (Supp. 2009). 
103 
1 06 
Ark. Code Ann.  § 15-72-101 (1994).  The Declaration  of Policy of the Act reads as follows: 
In recognition  of past, present, and imminent  evils occurring in the prod uction and 
use of oil and gas, as a result of waste in the production  and use thereof in the 
absence of coequal  or c01Telative rights of owners of crude oil or natural  gas. . this 
law is enacted for the protection  of public  and private interests against such evils 
by prohibiting  waste and compelling ratable production. 
1 07  Ark. Code Ann.  §  15-72-102(15)(A). 
1 08 Id 
1 09 Id 
§  15-72-102 (15) (B). 
§  15-72-102(15)©. 
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1 1 0 Id 
1 1 1 Id 
1 1 2 Id 
1 13 Id 
1 14 Id 
1 15 Id 
§  15-72-102 (15)(0). 
§  15-72-102(15)(E). 
§ 
§ 
15-72-102(15)(F) 
15-72-102(15)(1) 
§ 15-72-102(15)(K) 
§ 15-72-102(15)(G) 
1 1 6 §(J) Act  I 05 of February 30,  1939, 1939 Ark. Acts. 
1 1 7 Id. 
1 1 8  
A1iicle 60!4(J ), Title  102, Revised  Civil  Statutes of Texas. 
1 1 9 
§  16A Act of 05 of February 30,  1939,  1939 Ark.  Acts. 219, codified  at  I 5- l 7-324(a). 
120 Id. 
1 21 Id. 
1 22 
Wallace F. Lovejoy and Paul T. Homan,  supra N.  20 at  129.   The states wi th market demand 
status in  1965 were Texas, Louisiana,  Oklahoma, New  Mexico, Kansas, Alabama,  Florida,  Iowa, 
Michigan,  North  Carolina, North  Dakota and Washi ngton.  The top 5 market demand  states were 
Texas, Louisiana,  Oklahoma, New  Mexico  and  Kansas who had  70% of the crude oil prod uction. 
1 23  
Order no. 38-39, Aug.  16, 1939, Conservation  and Prevention  of Waste of Crude Petroleum 
and Natural  Gas in the State of Arkansas. 
1 24 Id. 
 
125 260 Ark. 436,  139 S.W.2d 683 (1940). 
1 26 
Eugene 0. Kuntz,  et al., Oil and  Gas Law Cases and  Materials, p. 89 (West Publishi ng Co. 
127  
§ 1(3) Act  of  I 05 of February 30,  1939, 1939 Ark. Act  219, cod ified  at  15-72-102(15)(C). 
1 28 104  1 W.L.  SUMMERS  § 317. 
129 
The language of Act  105 well  states the necessity for well spacing: "For the prevention  of 
waste and to avoid the augmenting and  accumulation  of risks arising from the drilling of an 
excessive number of wells, ...the Commission  shall  ...a drilling unit or units for each pool."  Act 
105 of February 20,  1939,  1939 Ark. Act. 210, §  14(8). 
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1 30 Id. 
131 Id. 
1 3? 
- Act 28 of January 30,  1951,  1951 Ark.  Acts. 29. 
1 33 Integralion  Order, Miller (Rodessa) Field, No.  18-39, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm., May 2,  1939; Bucker 
Lime Pool  Field  Ru les, Order No.  12-39, Ark.  Oil & Gas Comm., March  31 ,  1939. 
1 34  
Rarely,  if ever, did the AOGC  cross-section  lines or quatier-section  lines in establishing 
drilling units. 
135 
Act  of Mar. 31, 2003, § I , 2003 Ark. Act. 964 (amending Ark. Code Ann.  § 15-72-302(c)( I )). 
1 36  
See ARK. CODE ANN.  §  15-72-302(c)(l)  (Supp. 2009). 
1 371d § 15-72-302(c)(l)-(2) 
1 38 
Wronski  v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d  564, 569-70 (Mich. Ct. App.  1979) (discussing the "fair 
share" pri nciple. 
1 39 Id  Ark.  Code Ann.  §  15-72-302(d)(l ). 
140 Ark. Code Ann.  § 15-72-302(a)(l ). 
141 Id §  15-72-302(a)(2). 
142 
Ark.  Oil & Gas Comm'n. General  Rules  & Regulations  B-38(a) (2009),  available at 
http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Onli  neData/Fonns/Rules  %20and%20Regulations.pd f 
143 
Act  of  1985, No. 881 (codified  at A RK CODE ANN.  §  15-72-302(e)(l )-(3)(Supp.  2009)). 
144 ARK. CODE ANN.§  15-72-302(e)(2). 
1 45  Id . 
146 Id  §  15-72-302(e)(3). 
1 47  
OLIVER  WENDELL  HOLMES, THE COMMON  LAW  I , (Little, Brown,  & Co.  1881). 
148 
0wen L. Anderson,  "State Conservation Regulation-Single  Well Spacing and Pooling-Vis-c1- 
vis Federal  and Indian  Lands,  "Special Institute  on Federal  Onshore Oil and  Gas Pooling and 
Unitization, in Federal  Onshore Oil and Gas Pooling  and Unitization  2-1  (ROCKY MT. MIN. L. 
FOUND.  2006). 
1 49 
The aphorism  "one cup, one straw" was the explanation  for the Arkansas well-spacing  scheme 
under the Act provided  by the fonner Chaimrnn of the AOGC,  Boyd Alderson,  who served many 
years on the commission,  was a player  in the industry prior to  1939, and witnessed  the political 
process  that resulted  in the adoption of the Act. 
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1 50 
Thomas A. Daily & W. Christopher  Barrier,  Well, Now, Ain't  17wt Just  Fugacious!:  A Basic 
Primer  on Arkansas  Oil and  Gas Lmv,  29 U. A RK. LITTLE  ROCK L. REV. 21 1, 242 (2007); Dorsey 
Ryan, Optimal Density, 39th ANN. NAT. RES. L. INST.  1, 2 (ARK. BAR Ass'N  2000). Ryan, the 
chief proponent  of increased  density  in the No1ih  Arkansas  gas fields, described  the rule as the 
"infamous rule of one." 
1 51  
The late Ned  Price, a south Arkansas oil prod ucer and longtime member of the AOGC, was a 
passionate  proponent  of the  "vested rights" principle in administering the Arkansas well-spacing 
scheme. 
1 52  Daily & Barrier, supra  note  150, at 242-43. 
1 53 Id. 
 
1 54 
"window" is acreage in the oil and gas field that  is not  included  in an established  drilling unit. 
If such acreage was  smaller than the drilling units prescribed  by the field rules, an off-pattern 
drilling unit, with  a red uced  well  allowable, would  be required  to avoid a takings  claim under 
Arkansas or federal due process  constitutional  provisions. The policy  of avoiding  "windows" was 
part  of the motivation  of AOGC's  refusal  to cross section lines in configuring  drilling units. 
1 55 Ryan, supra  note  150, at 7. 
1 56 
In the earlier formative period  of the Arkansas Conservation  Act, oil and gas deposits in 
Arkansas  were thought  to underlay  the subsurface in a "blanket" fashion.   Modern  theory is that 
subsurface hydrocarbons mainly  lie within prehistoric  river channels. Daily & Barrier, supra  note 
150, at 243.  In Nmih  Arkansas most gas deposits were deltaic river channels.  Id  at n . 193. 
1 57 Ryan, supra  note ,150  at 1, 7-8. 
1 58 Jd at 7, 8, 1 1-12. 
1 59 
Jn re Peppers  R ef  Co., 272 P.2d  416 (Okla.  1954). The Oklahoma  Supreme Court opined  in 
Peppers  as follows: 
To hold that the Commission could never modify a well-spacing  pattern  established  by a 
previous  order not  appealed  from, upon  a showing of characteristics  about a common 
source of supply, and the withdrawals therefrom, that were not known  or anticipated  at 
the time of the original  order, would  "tie the hands" of the Commission  and often prevent 
i t from performing  its statutory  duties under  our Oil and Gas Conservation  Act.  Id  at 424. 
Daily, supra  note  150, at 243. 
 
Act 964 of March  31, 2003, 2003 Ark. Acts 964, (codified  at ARK CODE ANN.  § 15-72- 
160 
1 61 
302(b)(2)(A) and( B) (i)(ii), (Supp. 2009)),  amended  Act  105 to define a drilling unit and the 
AOGC's regulatory  authority as follows: 
(A)  As used  in this subchapter, "drilling unit" means a single governmental  section or the 
equivalent unless a larger or smaller area is requested  by  an owner, as defined  in [Arkansas  
Code Annotated  section]  15-72-102, within the drilling unit to be established and a larger 
or smaller area is established  by order of the commission. The drilling unit shall constitute 
a developed  unit  as long as a well is located thereon that  is capable of 
40 
 
producing  oil or gas in  paying quantities. 
(B) The commission  shall have the continuing authority to: 
(i) Designate the number  of wells that may be drilled and prod uced  within  a drilling 
unit; and 
(ii) Regulate the spacing among multiple wells drilled  and prod uced within a drilling 
unit. 
Id  §  15-72-302(b)(2)(B)(i)-(i i ). 1 62 
1 63 
Daily  & BaITier, supra  note  150, at 244. The authors further note that  "[s]ometimes this will 
involve a single well for each separate reservoir withi n the unit.   Other times, the AOGC will 
find the necessity  for multiple unit  wells within single tight reservoirs." Id 
1 64 
Rule B-43(c) provides  that  spacing rules are applicable to all  "conventional  and 
unconventional  sources of supply in  Arkansas,   Cleburne,   Conway,  Cross,  Faulkner, 
Independence,   Jackson, Lee, Lonoke, Monroe,  Phillips,  Prairie,  St. Francis, Van  Buren, White 
and  Woodruff  Counties, Arkansas."  ARK. OIL & GAS COMM 'N, GENERAL RULES & 
REGULATIONS , supra note  135, at B-43(c). 
1 65  Id 
166 Id 
1 67 Id 
1 68 Id 
1 69 Id 
1 70  Id 
at B-43(f) 
at B-43(i )(4) 
at B43(i)(3) 
at B-43(i)(4) 
at B-43(i)(2) 
at B-43(i)(5) 
1 711d at B-43(a)(2)(C) 
172 
"These cylinders are then laid  side by side and/or end to end  in patterns that  accomplish 
remarkably  effective and cost-efficient  drainage while,  at the same time, reducing surface 
impact."  Thomas A. Daily and W. Christopher  Barrier, supra  note  150, at 244. 
1 73 
ARK. OIL & GAS COMM 'N, GENERAL  RULES & REGULATIONS , supra  note  135, at B-43(0). 
1 74 
ARK. OIL & GAS COMM 'N, GENERAL  RULES & REGULATIONS , supra  note 59, at B-43(0)(1). 
1 75 Id 
1 76 Id 
at B-43(o)(l )(A)-(B). 
at B-43(0 )(I )(A).  The "half circle" drawn at the beginning and  ending of the perforated 
horizontal  well bore is a modification  for horizontal  wells of the theory of radial  drainage, 
inherent  in the doctrine of compensatory drainage,  applied  to traditional  vertical  wells. 
177 Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann.  § I 02.01 1 (Vernon  1978). 
41 
 
1 78 Ark. Code Ann.  § l 5-72-303(b) 
179  
Ark. Code Ann.  § l 7-72-304(a); Thomas A. Daily, Lawyeri ng the Fayetteville Shale Play 
-Welcome to my World, 44 Ark. Lawyer  10,  1 1 (2009). 
1 80  Thomas A. Daily, Supra N. 179 at  1 1 ; Ark. Code Ann.  §  17-72-304(b)(4). 
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